Asserts that Shareholder-Driven Change is
Needed at the 2022 Annual Meeting to Mitigate Further Value
Destruction Under Hasbro’s Arrogant, Insular and Ineffective
Board
Highlights Risks Associated with Reelecting
Incumbents Responsible for Years of Underperformance and Egregious
Capital Allocation, Including the $4.6 Billion eOne Deal
Puts Spotlight on Hasbro Chairman Rich
Stoddart's Long History of Value Destruction and Lack of
Qualifications to Oversee Hasbro
Questions the Board’s Entrenchment Agenda
and Unwillingness to Embrace Shareholder Input Following Years of
Poor Returns
Urges Shareholders to Elect Alta Fox’s
Three-Member Slate on the GOLD Proxy
Card to Inject Capital Allocation, Strategic Planning and
Transformation Expertise into the Boardroom
Alta Fox Capital Management, LLC (together with its affiliates,
“Alta Fox” or “we”), the beneficial owner of approximately 2.5% of
the outstanding shares of Hasbro, Inc. (NASDAQ: HAS) (“Hasbro” or
the “Company”), today announced that it has filed a definitive
proxy statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
connection with Hasbro's 2022 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. Alta
Fox disclosed in its materials that it has reduced its slate to
three director candidates after taking into account Hasbro’s recent
expansion of its Board of Directors, the Company’s most pressing
needs and feedback from other shareholders. In addition, Alta Fox
sent the below letter to shareholders.
Learn more about the Alta Fox slate and how to vote for
boardroom change on the GOLD proxy
card by visiting www.FreeTheWizards.com.
***
Fellow Shareholder,
Alta Fox Capital Management, LLC (together with its affiliates,
“Alta Fox” or “we”) is a top 10 shareholder of Hasbro, Inc.
(NASDAQ: HAS) (“Hasbro” or the “Company”), signaling our strong
alignment with you and all of the Company’s stakeholders. We own
approximately 2.5% of Hasbro’s outstanding shares because we
believe it is an iconic American brand with attractive assets and
tremendous value creation potential. We intend to be a long-term
shareholder of Hasbro and are fully committed to taking the
necessary steps to help finally unlock that potential.
Unfortunately, Hasbro’s high-quality assets have failed to
deliver on their promise under the current Board of Directors (the
“Board”). The Company has been a chronic underperformer and
currently trades at a significant discount to its intrinsic value.
In fact, its share price is materially lower today than it was five
years ago, making it a troubled investment for many of its
shareholders. In our view, Hasbro’s stagnation and poor shareholder
returns are largely due to an arrogant, insular and ineffective
Board. For too long, a group of seemingly unqualified directors has
presided – without sufficient accountability – over abysmal capital
allocation, excessive executive compensation, highly concerning
governance, opaque disclosures and a flawed corporate
structure.
It is important to stress that we have gone to great lengths to
try to compromise with the Board and collaborate on a viable
director refresh that would have addressed our concerns and
advanced all stakeholders’ interests. Unfortunately, the Company
did not appear to take our efforts seriously:
- When we made director candidates available for interviews, the
Board was primarily focused on trying to convince our nominees not
to associate with us – rather than objectively evaluating their
credentials and qualifications.1 This was particularly alarming
given our candidates have backgrounds as public company c-suite
executives and directors with diverse experience in relevant
areas.
- When we made a good faith settlement proposal, the Board
refused to have any substantive discussions about shareholder
representation and the value of a viable refresh versus a
reactionary expansion of the number of directors.
- The Board’s only attempt to avoid an election contest was
offering to give us public credit for its own defensive measures,
such as its addition of two new directors without strong capital
allocation, governance and strategic transformation
backgrounds.
- The Board demonstrated just how disingenuous it is by
ultimately asking Alta Fox to rubberstamp the Company’s hand-picked
candidates.
- The Board was covertly focused on expanding from an already
bloated 11 members to an indefensible 13 members.
- The Board dismissed compromise in favor of hiring an army of
expensive advisors that includes two law firms, two proxy
solicitation firms and two investment banks for defense support, in
addition to a cadre of public relations consultants apparently
peddling blatant distortions to talking heads like Andrew Ross
Sorkin and Jim Cramer.
After assessing this appalling level of arrogance and
considering the risks associated with further empowering this
Board, we felt absolutely compelled to proceed with a campaign to
elect highly qualified individuals with fresh perspectives and open
minds at the 2022 Annual Meeting of Shareholders (the “Annual
Meeting”).
We have recently had conversations with a large number of our
fellow shareholders about Hasbro’s most pressing needs and who the
right change agents would be on a truly refreshed Board. Following
these discussions, we have proactively modified our slate to
include three members who are particularly well-suited to help
reset the culture in Hasbro’s boardroom. The candidates we are
running – Marcelo Fischer, Rani Hublou and Carolyn Johnson – have
valuable experience in relevant areas such as capital allocation,
corporate transformations, strategic planning and value creation in
public markets. Each of our candidates also appreciates the
importance of maintaining good corporate governance and soliciting
actionable shareholder feedback.
Looking ahead, we believe that this election contest is about
one question:
Are shareholders better off
maintaining an insular and entrenched Board that has overseen
dismal returns OR with a truly
refreshed and more independent Board with greater capital
allocation acumen, business transformation expertise and governance
experience?
We believe the answer is clear. If our three-member slate is
elected, the Board will have a better mix of institutional
knowledge, fresh perspectives, capital allocation discipline and
objectivity when it comes to charting a go-forward business
strategy. As first-time Chief Executive Officer Chris Cocks begins
his tenure, it is the right time for shareholders to elect
accountable and independent directors that are less tied to the
Hassenfeld family and more aligned with Hasbro’s shareholder
base.
HASBRO HAS BEEN RUN
LIKE A PRIVATE COMPANY FOR DECADES DUE TO THE HASSENFELD FAMILY’S
INFLUENCE – AND SHAREHOLDERS HAVE PAID THE PRICE
In our view, Hasbro has often put the Hassenfeld family’s
interests ahead of those of other shareholders. Since 1970,
Hasbro's leadership has consistently included several members of
the Hassenfeld family, including current Chairman Emeritus Alan
Hassenfeld, who rose from President to CEO without any prior
experience or apparent relevant qualifications for the role. Mr.
Hassenfeld's mother, Sylvia Hassenfeld, was also a long-time
director of Hasbro. We believe the Hassenfeld family's de facto
control and influence over the Company has resulted in chronically
value-destructive decision-making and an apparent lack of
objectivity in the boardroom.
Shareholders should not forget that when Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel")
offered to buy Hasbro for a 73% premium in an all-equity
transaction in January 1996, the Hassenfeld-led Board not only
quickly rejected the offer, but also launched a blitz campaign to
persuade Rhode Island legislators “to pass a law making takeover
attempts more difficult.”2 This included preventing owners of 10%
or more of a company’s shares from calling a special meeting.
Subsequently, in June 2010, with Mr. Hassenfeld on the Board,
Providence Equity Partners LLC ("Providence") approached the
Company about acquiring the business. Not only did Hasbro rebuff
Providence, but multiple accounts suggest the Board was unwilling
to sell the business for any price – a clear example of the
Hassenfeld family’s focus on maintaining control and influence over
the Company rather than delivering the best outcome for
shareholders.3
The consequences of prioritizing the Hassenfeld family's
interests over those of the Company's shareholders are clear to us
when taking into account the following:
- Hasbro underperformed the S&P 500 by more than 100% during
Mr. Hassenfeld’s 14-year tenure as CEO, while also underperforming
Mattel by over 340%.
- When Mr. Hassenfeld's CEO tenure ended in May 2003, Hasbro's
share price remained more than 30% below the market implied Mattel
offer price in 1996.
- Hasbro has underperformed the S&P 500 by more than 200%
since June 2010, when the Board rejected Providence's interest in
acquiring the Company. 4
While the Hassenfeld family may no longer hold a controlling
stake in Hasbro, we believe Hasbro's boardroom still contains the
same insular, controlled Company culture today. With the exception of the new directors added just weeks
ago in response to our campaign, all current independent Board
members were appointed during Mr. Hassenfeld's tenure. Based on our
interaction with the Board to date, we have concluded that it lacks
the objectivity to properly evaluate the Company's performance,
governance and go-forward strategy.
WE BELIEVE HASBRO
SUFFERS FROM AN ARROGANT, INSULAR AND INEFFECTIVE BOARD CULTURE
UNDER RICH STODDART AND OTHER LONG-TENURED DIRECTORS
Under the current Board, Hasbro has underperformed the broader
market and relevant indices – including the Company's own
benchmark, the Russell 1000 Consumer Discretionary Index – across
nearly every relevant time horizon. Over
the past five years, Hasbro has lagged the S&P 500 by more than
100%. This is the case despite operating in a strong
bull market fueled by unprecedented stimulus and historically low
interest rates. Today, Hasbro's shares trade near a 52-week low,
indicating to us the market's clear lack of faith in the Board.
As Hasbro’s shareholders have suffered over the last five years,
its senior leadership and directors have collectively received more
than $215 million in compensation. The Board, has also repeatedly
lowered corporate targets, including in 2012, 2013, 2015, 2019 and
2021. When subtracting Entertainment One's ("eOne") inorganic
revenue contribution from Hasbro’s 2021 annual revenue target, the
adjusted revenue target was 11% lower than Hasbro’s 2017 revenue
target and target EBIT margins were 220 basis points lower than the
2017 EBIT margin target. Despite weak underlying performance, the
Company’s most recent proxy statement disclosed that CEO
compensation has soared to $26.8 million – 324x the median Hasbro
employee's total compensation and 381x the median Rhode Island
household income.5 We are troubled that under Compensation
Committee Chair Lisa Gersh, many of Hasbro's executive compensation
metrics (revenue, EBIT margin, free cash flow, ROIC) have been
manipulated by the Board to ensure leadership receives rich payouts
that are not closely tied to shareholder value creation.
We are not alone in our criticism of the Board's inability to
set equitable compensation targets for management. Following the
target cuts in 2012 and 2013, shareholders voted overwhelmingly
against Hasbro's say-on-pay proposal at the 2014 Annual Meeting. In
connection with last year’s Annual Meeting, a leading independent
proxy advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.
(“ISS”), recommended shareholders vote for Hasbro's say-on-pay
proposal “with caution.” ISS cited the $12 million award to the
eOne CEO as well as Hasbro’s “temporary move to a primarily
time-based equity award program in 2021.”
We believe Hasbro's egregious and
misaligned compensation structure is symptomatic of poor boardroom
stewardship under the Stoddart-led Board.
A CLOSER LOOK AT
CHAIRMAN RICH STODDART’S RECORD OF VALUE DESTRUCTION AND THE
HASSENFELD FAMILY’S UNBROKEN GRIP ON HASBRO
The primary qualification of Rich
Stoddart when he was appointed to the Board appears to have been
that he was in the same 1985 Dartmouth College graduating class as
the former CEO of Hasbro under whom he was appointed.
Leveraging that relationship, Mr. Stoddart subsequently became
interim CEO and is now, inexplicably to us and many others, the
Chairman of the Board. However, we contend that Mr. Stoddart is a
perpetual value destroyer who is unqualified to be Chairman. His
record of value destruction speaks for itself:
- Mr. Stoddart’s latest operating role was as CEO of
Innerworkings (“INWK”), a formerly public company, where results
under his tenure were disastrous for shareholders. INWK’s share
price declined an astonishing 68.49% during his roughly
two-and-a-half years as CEO, before the company was sold. This
compared to a 32.30% return for the S&P 500 during the same
time period.
- While investors lost nearly over two-thirds of the value of
their investment in INWK, Mr. Stoddart made over $13 million during
his short tenure as CEO and even accepted a generous
change-in-control bonus when the company was sold at a depressed
price.
- Prior to INWK, Mr. Stoddart was CEO at Leo Burnett, an
advertising agency. During his tenure there, Stoddart “presided
over some major, demoralizing account losses, including the U.S.
Army, Morgan Stanley and several chunks of Con Agra business.”
Reports at the time indicated that Mr. Stoddart “might not have
moved fast enough—or boldly enough” to prevent losing key
accounts.6
With such catastrophic performance in his prior roles, our view
is that Mr. Stoddart should never have been appointed to the Board
of such a large and prominent entity as Hasbro – let alone be
allowed to serve as interim CEO or Chairman. One can only wonder
whether any of Hasbro’s recent losses of key contracts to rival
Mattel are related to Mr. Stoddart not moving “fast enough—or
boldly enough” as interim CEO and Chairman.7
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE
BOARD’S RECKLESS AND WASTEFUL CAPITAL ALLOCATION
DECISIONS
We believe the current Board has embraced a reckless capital
allocation policy, characterized by nebulous brand-building
initiatives with limited financial accountability and little
investor transparency. In particular, we think that shareholders
have suffered immensely due to the Board's lack of financial
discipline on major capital allocation decisions, including
acquisitions.
We view the defining moment of the “Brand Blueprint” era as the
2019 acquisition of eOne for $4.6 billion, a 30% premium to eOne’s
all-time-high share price and approximately 18x its trailing 12
months EBITDA. This seemingly illogical deal diluted shareholders,
added a substantial amount of debt to the balance sheet,
complicated the investor narrative and destroyed significant value.
Hasbro’s shares declined 9% the day of the deal announcement and
still remain dramatically lower today than pre-acquisition levels.
To us, the fact that the incumbent directors continue to defend the
eOne deal and the "Brand Blueprint" strategy despite such a poor
outcome speaks volumes about the need for boardroom change.
We also believe that Hasbro has wasted significant capital in
its core Consumer toys and boardgame business and Wizards of the
Coast segment. Despite pouring more than $5 billion of
shareholders’ money into Hasbro’s Consumer business, the segment
has significantly underperformed and lost market share to Mattel
over the last four years. Similarly, Hasbro has pursued several
non-core initiatives in its Wizards of the Coast business that have
failed to meet expectations, including a Transformers card game
(2017) and a D&D Dark Alliance video game (2021). We find it
concerning that the Board has continued to pursue non-core
investments at Wizards of the Coast, including a AAA G.I. Joe video
game currently in development, despite waning interest in the
intellectual property as evidenced by multiple poor performances at
the box office.8 The Board has misallocated a significant portion
of the Company's research and development budget, to the detriment
of attractive reinvestment opportunities within Wizards of the
Coast's core franchises.
In addition to poor capital allocation decisions, we view
Hasbro's opaque disclosure practices under the incumbent Board as a
key reason for why the Company trades at a significant discount to
its intrinsic value. For example, Hasbro chose to not report
revenue and EBITDA for Wizards of the Coast – which represented 42%
of the Company's total EBITDA in FY 2020 – until 2021 and continues
to withhold other key performance indicators for the segment. Even
in recent results, the Company makes it impossible for investors to
understand what large internal projects are being developed and how
those projects are being accounted for in the financial
statements.9 Most recently, the Board swiftly rejected our idea for
a financial or operational spin-off of Wizards of the Coast without
providing the details of its rationale or analysis with
shareholders. In light of the Board’s apparent credibility issues,
we find it hard to believe that the Company comprehensively and
objectively evaluated strategic alternatives for the unit.
Shareholders deserve a detailed explanation of the Board’s
purported evaluation, and the analysis should be re-examined with
shareholder-appointed directors focused on creating shareholder
value rather than preserving the Hassenfeld family legacy. To date,
the Company has provided little evidence of business unit
“synergies” that could not be accomplished through a partnership
arrangement.
We urge shareholders to see through the Board's deception and
remember that under the direction of the incumbent Board, Hasbro
has consistently underperformed, rebuffed potential acquirers and
wasted billions of dollars in shareholder capital without ever
acknowledging mistakes.
IT IS TIME TO REMOVE
INEFFECTIVE INCUMBENTS AND INSTALL HIGHLY QUALIFIED DIRECTORS WITH
FRESH EXPERIENCE AND IMPARTIAL VIEWPOINTS
In our view, both a change in culture and shift in strategy are
urgently needed to clean up Hasbro's boardroom and unlock the full
value of the Company. With the addition of our independent and
highly qualified director candidates, we believe the Board will be
positioned to embark on a disciplined strategy that delivers
superior value for all stakeholders.
We are seeking to replace three directors: the Chairman, the
Head of the Compensation Committee and the Company’s
longest-tenured director. These individuals have collectively
overseen significant stagnation and underperformance, do not
possess the backgrounds, skills or vision needed to transform
Hasbro at this critical moment and are not qualified to serve on
the Board. In addition to being appointed during Mr. Hassenfeld's
tenure, we also note that while the directors we are seeking to
replace have collected millions of dollars in Board fees, none of
them have ever used that money to purchase shares of Hasbro,
demonstrating a lack of confidence in the Company and poor
alignment with shareholders. By removing these three directors,
shareholders will send a strong message to the Board that the
continued disregard for minority shareholders amid poor performance
and egregious compensation practices will no longer be
tolerated.
- We believe Chairman Rich Stoddart, who
has served on the Board for eight years, is unqualified to continue
serving. As detailed above, Mr. Stoddart has a long
track record of value destruction, at Hasbro and elsewhere. We also
believe that Mr. Stoddart lacks relevant capital allocation,
technology and strategic planning expertise necessary to
effectively serve as a director – let alone Chairman – of
Hasbro.
- We believe Lisa Gersh, who has served
on the Board for nearly 12 years and overseen Hasbro’s egregious
compensation practices, is unqualified to continue serving on the
Board. As Chair of the Company's Compensation Committee,
shareholders should hold Ms. Gersh directly responsible for the
Company’s excessive and unjustifiable executive compensation
practices, under which management has been paid more and more
despite chronic underperformance and dismal shareholder returns. In
addition to her track record as a director of Hasbro, we note that
Ms. Gersh’s previous tenures at Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia,
Inc. ("Martha Stewart") and Knot Inc. ("Knot") were also disastrous
for shareholders. Martha Stewart delivered a negative 30%
annualized return for shareholders during Ms. Gersh’s time as
President and later CEO. In a seemingly self-serving move, Ms.
Gersh abruptly resigned from Knot's board, which put the company in
non-compliance of Securities and Exchange Commission standards with
fewer than three members on its audit committee.10 Two days later,
she joined Hasbro's Board.11
- We believe it is time for Board member
Edward Philip, who has served on the Board for nearly 20 years, to
move on. We question how Mr. Philip is even able to
focus on Hasbro given that he currently serves on the boards of
five other companies, including a poorly performing SPAC, Blade Air
Mobility Inc. (NASDAQ: BLDE). The fact that Mr. Philip, who is
woefully over-tenured by any reasonable standard, appears to have
been unwilling to step down as part of Hasbro’s defensive Board
refresh after spending two decades on the Board suggests serious
entrenchment issues.
On the heels of Mr. Cocks' appointment, shareholders have a
unique opportunity to surround him with a credibly refreshed, truly
independent Board at the outset of his tenure. In contrast to the
incumbents we are seeking to replace, our nominees possess the
requisite impartiality, capital allocation acumen, governance
expertise and strategic planning experience to help ensure Mr.
Cocks succeeds in his new role. If elected, our nominees are
committed to working in a collegial manner with the remaining Board
to explore all paths to value creation and rebuild trust with
Hasbro's stakeholders.
- Marcelo Fischer has a
strong background in capital allocation, corporate finance,
strategic transactions and the consumer and technology sectors.
- Currently the Chief Financial Officer of IDT Corporation
(“IDT”) (NYSE: IDT), a multinational provider of cloud
communications and financial services, and has also served as the
CFO of IDT Telecom since June 2007. During Mr. Fischer’s tenure as
CFO, IDT (inclusive of all spin-off transactions) has compounded
shareholder value at 25% a year compared to the S&P 500 at less
than 10% annualized.
- Continues to play a key role in unlocking shareholder value at
IDT with several successful spin-offs executed historically at IDT
and two new spin-offs currently in the works. Importantly, Mr.
Fischer has been instrumental in promoting investor transparency
across complicated and unrelated business segments while at
IDT.
- Received a B.A. in Economics from the University of Maryland
and an M.B.A. in Finance from the New York University Stern School
of Business.
- Mr. Fischer’s significant spin-off experience, cost discipline
and demonstrated track record of value creation in public markets
through optimizing corporate structures and promoting investor
transparency make him highly qualified to help solve the existing
challenges at Hasbro.
- Rani Hublou is a proven
corporate leader with vast experience in strategic planning –
including overseeing subscription-based revenue model transitions –
product innovation, supply chain management, corporate governance,
and marketing.
- Former Chief Marketing Officer of 8x8, Inc. (NASDAQ: EGHT),
Chief Product Officer at Comprehend Systems, Inc. and Chief
Marketing Officer and Sales Executive at PSS Systems, Inc.
(acquired by International Business Machines (NASDAQ: IBM)).
- Former strategic consultant at McKinsey & Company, Inc., a
leading management consulting firm.
- Director of Tecsys Inc. (TSX: TCS), a supply chain management
software company, since 2020 where she is helping oversee a
business model transformation from perpetual to subscription
license sales. Ms. Hublou also serves on the compensation committee
and has aligned management performance targets according to Tecsys
transformation goals.
- Received an M.S. and a B.S. in Industrial Engineering from
Stanford University.
- Ms. Hublou’s deep strategy experience in areas such as
transitioning businesses to subscription-based revenue models and
navigating complex supply chains would add significant value to the
Board of Hasbro given Hasbro’s complex supply chain and numerous
DTC subscription opportunities within its core franchises.
- Carolyn Johnson has a
proven track record of delivering significant value to shareholders
through her experience as a business transformation leader and
corporate governance expert with compensation committee experience,
and a strong negotiation background with several successful asset
sales totaling billions of dollars.
- Drove significant value for shareholders during her tenure at
Majesco, LLC (formerly NASDAQ: MJCO), which delivered an 84%
annualized total shareholder return during her tenure. Ms. Johnson
helped negotiate the ultimate sale price of Majesco to Thoma Bravo,
which improved from $13.10 to $16.00, a greater than 100% premium
to Majesco’s pre-deal trading price. She also served on Majesco's
compensation committee.
- Recently served as the Chief Transformation Officer of American
International Group, Inc. (NYSE: AIG), an international insurance
organization where she executed on Carl Icahn’s activist plan for
change, resulting in $250 million of cost savings in the first
eight months and developing a roadmap to $1 billion in savings over
a three-year period.
- Previously held the position of Chief Executive Officer of
Annuities and Individual Life at Voya Financial, Inc. (NYSE: VOYA),
an insurance company. After leading the division for four years,
Ms. Johnson led its sale to Apollo in 2018 for $1.1 billion.
- Received a B.S. in Business Administration with a focus in
Finance from California State University, Los Angeles and completed
the Finance for Senior Executives course at Harvard Business
School.
- Ms. Johnson’s relentless focus on creating shareholder value,
track record of success as both a director and operator, corporate
governance and compensation expertise, and success executing
complex transactions and transformations, would provide significant
value to the Hasbro boardroom in light of the Board’s strategic
execution and governance failures to date.
We suspect Hasbro has dismissed our candidates because they
represent exactly what the Board fears: truly independent
perspectives that will demand accountability, discipline and
transparency in the boardroom. After five years of languishing
returns, Hasbro needs new directors to reverse the underperformance
and ensure that minority shareholders have the proper governance
they deserve. It is very telling that a Board with such a poor
track record would be so arrogant and reject legitimate settlement
offers from us, choosing instead to drag all stakeholders into a
distracting and expensive contest.12 We are asking you to help
bring accountability to Hasbro by removing long-tenured and
underperforming directors, and replacing them with the three
engaged and experienced change agents we have nominated.
We thank you in advance for your consideration and willingness
to evaluate our case for boardroom change. To contact us or to
learn how to vote on the GOLD proxy
card for our slate, please visit www.FreeTheWizards.com.
Sincerely,
Connor Haley Managing Partner Alta Fox Capital Management,
LLC
***
About Alta Fox
Founded in 2018 by Connor Haley, Alta Fox is a Texas-based
alternative asset management firm that employs a long-term focused
investment strategy to pursue exceptional risk-adjusted returns for
a diverse group of institutions and qualified individual clients.
Alta Fox focuses on identifying often overlooked and
under-the-radar opportunities across asset classes, market
capitalization ranges and sectors. Learn more by visiting
www.AltaFoxCapital.com.
1 For example, when interviewing Marcelo Fischer, current CFO at
IDT Corp (NYSE: IDT), one of Hasbro’s Board members aggressively
questioned how a current CFO could have time to be on another
public company board. This Board member apparently was unaware of
the fact that Hasbro’s own CFO currently sits on the Logitech
(NASDAQ: LOGI) board of directors. 2 Bloomberg Business News U.S.
Page One: Feb 2, 1996. 3 https://toynewsi.com/news.php?itemid=16035
and
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/hasbro-says-not-interested-in-selling-company-2010-06-24.
4 If we assume that Providence Equity Partners would have paid a
30% acquisition premium to take Hasbro private and factor that into
our analysis of the Board’s performance, Hasbro would have
underperformed the S&P 500 by almost 300%. 5 Company's 2022
proxy statement and U.S. Census data. 6
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/chicago-sun-times/20070109/282140696898798.
7
https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2022/01/26/mattel-shares-jump-after-it-recoups-disney-princess-toy-rights-from-rival-hasbro/?sh=3e26320857fc.
8
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottmendelson/2021/08/23/snake-eyes-box-office-disaster-gi-joe-termintor-aliens-predator/?sh=49d58508138e.
9 For example, Hasbro does not break out capitalized development
expense by segment. It is therefore impossible for investors to
know how much of Wizards of the Coast’s research and development is
capitalized versus expensed — a key question for any investor
trying to understand the unit economics. 10
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001062292/000114420410036514/v189877_8k.htm.
11
https://investor.hasbro.com/news-releases/news-release-details/hasbro-elects-lisa-gersh-its-board-directors.
12
https://www.reuters.com/business/exclusive-hasbro-snubs-alta-fox-board-nominee-offer-settlement-talks-sources-2022-03-27/.
View source
version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220426006218/en/
For Investors:
Okapi Partners Mark Harnett, 646-556-9350
mharnett@okapipartners.com
For Media:
Longacre Square Partners Greg Marose / Bela Kirpalani,
646-386-0091 gmarose@longacresquare.com /
bkirpalani@longacresquare.com
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