The Trian Group,1 which beneficially owns $3 billion of common
stock in The Walt Disney Company (NYSE: DIS) (“Disney” or the
“Company”), today filed its definitive proxy statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with its
nomination of Nelson Peltz and James A. (“Jay”) Rasulo for election
to the Disney Board of Directors (the “Board”) at the Company’s
2024 Annual Meeting of Shareholders and released a letter to its
fellow Disney shareholders. The full text of the letter is below
and available to view online at:
https://restorethemagic.com/02-01-24/.
February 1, 2024
Dear Fellow Walt Disney Company
Shareholder:
The Trian Group1 owns more than $3 billion of shares of The Walt
Disney Company.
Like you, we are enthusiastic owners of this iconic company
because we believe Disney is the leading media and entertainment
business, with outstanding assets:
- Beloved franchises like Star Wars and Marvel;
- Disney and Pixar Animation Studios, which produced some of the
greatest films of all time;
- Theme parks and cruise lines that attract millions of people
from around the world each year; and
- Disney+, an emerging streaming giant with a library of enviable
content.
Disney occupies a unique place in the hearts of millions of
people with its deep history of captivating stories while creating
unforgettable experiences.
Despite Disney’s enviable and unique position in media and
entertainment, its stock price is half what it was less than three
years ago and Disney shareholders – like you and us – have
collectively lost nearly $200 billion of our investment in
that time.2 Disney’s recent creative efforts have disappointed its
once-loyal customer base and have caused losses for shareholders.
Disney was forced to cut its dividend and only recently restored
it3 – meanwhile shareholders missed out on more than $12 billion in
expected distributions between 2020 and 2023.4
Disney’s stock is down over the last one, three and five
years. In fact, over those time periods, Disney’s total
shareholder return (“TSR”) has significantly underperformed the
stocks of other media and entertainment companies, despite Disney’s
superior assets, capabilities and businesses. Disney’s TSR has
underperformed the S&P 500 by a wide margin over each of those
time periods, too.5
One year ago, three years ago, five years ago or ten years ago,
you would have been far better served investing in an index
fund like the S&P 500, or in a basket of Disney’s self-selected
peers, than in Disney itself.6 Instead, you, like us, have
been caught in the Disney mousetrap.
With so many powerful competitive advantages, why has Disney
cost shareholders so much?
The simple answer: Disney has lost its way!
- The Company’s creative engine has stalled. For
the first time in nearly a decade, Disney has lost its position as
the highest-grossing movie studio.7 Disney’s last five films have
collectively cost over $1 billion to produce, and yet two of those
films have lost money, and another barely eked out a profit.8
Disney’s reputation as the world’s preeminent entertainment company
– and the flywheel that drives its business – is at risk.
- Disney+, the emerging streaming business, has been
poorly managed. Since the service was launched in 2019,
Disney+ has failed to achieve profitability in any fiscal year. And
while Netflix generates attractive profits, margins and cash flow
from its streaming service, success at Disney+ has been elusive.
Today, Netflix generates approximately 21 cents of profit for every
dollar of revenue; in its 2023 fiscal year, Disney lost
approximately 14 cents for every dollar of streaming revenue.9 In
total, the streaming businesses have cost the Company more than $14
billion in operating losses over the last six years.10
- ESPN is challenged and lacks a clear strategy.
ESPN is one of the most respected brands in sports media, but the
once-lucrative business has suffered as cord-cutting has
accelerated and sports rights costs have dramatically increased.
ESPN has continued to shed subscribers, and investments into the
direct-to-consumer app appear to lack clear return targets and
payback is uncertain. Operating income for Disney’s Sports segment,
which includes ESPN, dramatically declined in 2023.11
- Prices have gone up in the Parks even as investment has
been deferred. Disney’s parks have long been a crown jewel
of the Company and remain an important part of its future. But even
though admission prices have increased by more than 35% over the
last ten years,12 Disney recently revealed the need to invest a
whopping $60 billion into its parks and cruise lines over the next
ten years, seemingly to catch up for delayed or deferred
investment.13 Disney has failed to answer how it plans to compete
with Universal’s new attractions, why it has not kept pace with
development, how and where this money will be spent, or what
returns shareholders can expect to earn on this massive
investment.
As a result of these and other issues, and despite spending $200
billion since 2018 on assets and acquisitions (such as the purchase
of 21st Century Fox), Disney’s financial performance has suffered.
Operating income, free cash flow and earnings per share have
declined by 18%, 50% and 85%, respectively, since 2018.14
In our view, Disney’s strategic missteps and declining financial
performance can be laid at the feet of its Board, which we believe
lacks focus, alignment and accountability.
- Lack of Focus: Many of Disney’s directors have
important day jobs running some of the largest automobile, apparel,
sporting goods and software companies in the world. They have
demanding, full-time work commitments and are likely waking up
every day thinking about things other than Disney. Faced with
complicated challenges in their executive roles, we believe these
busy directors have taken their “eyes off the ball” at Disney.
- Lack of Alignment: Disney’s non-management
directors have amassed great personal wealth, having received in
the aggregate more than $700 million in compensation from their
jobs at companies other than Disney during their tenures on the
Disney Board.15 Yet, despite their significant resources and
sizable investment portfolios, Disney’s eleven non-management
directors appear to have so little faith in Disney’s future that
they have purchased a total of less than $350,000 of Disney stock
during their tenures. Nine of them have never bought a single
share!16 Relative to their wealth, they have almost no skin in the
game. Meanwhile, Disney’s CEO, Bob Iger, has sold nearly all of his
Disney stock, reaping proceeds in cash of more than $1 billion;
today, he is left owning comparatively few shares.17
- Lack of Accountability: Despite years of
Disney underperformance and shareholder discontent that has been
repeatedly expressed at Disney’s annual shareholder meeting
votes,18 the Board continues to claim it knows best, refusing to
heed input from shareholders or add shareholder-selected directors
to the Board who can bring fresh perspectives to Disney’s
challenges.
We do not believe the current Board can solve Disney’s problems.
To Restore the Magic, we need new perspectives,
fresh thinking and tangible goals. We certainly do not expect this
same Board that has sat idle, watching Disney’s decline, to
suddenly change and have the drive to fix Disney. So, to ensure a
better future for this great company, we, its owners, must act!
We are therefore asking you to elect two new, independent
directors – Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo – to
Disney’s Board of Directors.
- Nelson Peltz beneficially owns more than $3
billion of Disney stock.19 He is one of the most experienced
directors in corporate America, having served on more than a dozen
public company boards, including world-class companies and
household names like Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Wendy’s, H. J.
Heinz and Mondelēz. During his tenure on these and other boards, he
has helped create tremendous value for shareholders and drive
important initiatives including leadership succession, management
compensation realignment, organizational improvements and
operational turnarounds.20
- Jay Rasulo beneficially owns more than
$600,000 of Disney stock. He is a Disney veteran who spent three
decades at the Company in a variety of roles, including five years
as Chief Financial Officer. During his tenure as CFO, Disney’s
stock price increased by more than 250% and the Company paid more
than $8 billion in dividends to shareholders.21 Prior to being
appointed Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Rasulo ran Disney’s Parks
and Resorts business, during which time the Parks and Resorts
division delivered consistent revenue and operating income
growth.
Real change is needed! There is much to be done to revive
Disney, delight consumers again and drive value for its owners.
Disney’s current directors do not want our candidates inside the
board room. Perhaps they do not want the hard questions and focus
on shareholder value. The Disney Board is seeking to exclude them
and appease shareholders with its own appointments, adding two new,
hand-selected directors that were chosen without shareholder input.
You should be wary of cosmetic “change” orchestrated by the same
directors who have consistently failed shareholders.
If elected, Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo will seek to work
diligently and collaboratively with the other Disney directors and
management to:
- Initiate a Board-led review of the Company’s creative processes
and structure so that Disney can once again claim its #1
position at the box office while consistently delivering
industry-leading content and Disney hallmarks;
- Insist that management finally develop and implement an
executable plan for the streaming business in order to
achieve Netflix-like levels of profitability;
- Have the leadership team commit to a detailed plan that
includes a reasonable payback period and return
profile for all future investments in the
direct-to-consumer ESPN business;
- Press management to disclose the expected returns on
the $60 billion of announced investments in the Parks and
Experiences business;
- Align pay and performance for the Company’s senior
leaders by tying compensation to clear, measurable and
ambitious goals; and
- Finally execute a successful CEO succession
process, while cultivating a deep bench of capable,
next-generation leaders.
We encourage you to vote “FOR” Nelson Peltz and Jay
Rasulo using the instructions on the enclosed BLUE proxy
card to enable them to pursue this ambitious agenda.
To make room for Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo on the Board, you
also need to “WITHHOLD” your vote on two of the Board’s current
directors. We are strongly recommending shareholders “WITHHOLD” on
incumbent directors Michael Froman and Maria Elena Lagomasino.
- “WITHHOLD” on Michael B.G. Froman. Apart from
his wife’s long personal relationship with the wife of Disney CEO
Bob Iger22, it is unclear to us why Mr. Froman – who has spent much
of the past 25 years of his career as a financial executive, a
federal trade representative and a national security advisor – was
appointed to the Board. It appears that Disney is equally
mystified: by the Company’s own admission, Mr. Froman possesses
just one skill that is central to Disney’s strategy.23 Mr. Froman
has never served on another public company board. He also does not
appear to believe in Disney’s future the way we all do: throughout
his tenure as a director, he has never bought even a single share
of Disney stock with his own money.
- “WITHHOLD” on Maria Elena Lagomasino. Ms.
Lagomasino has Chaired Disney’s Compensation Committee since 2019
and has been a member of that Committee since 2015. During her
tenure on the Compensation Committee, Ms. Lagomasino has overseen
payments of over $800 million to Disney’s
executives24 while shareholders have suffered, with Disney’s stock
losing nearly 20% of its value and your dividend being
significantly reduced.25 Among other things, Ms. Lagomasino oversaw
the awarding of a four-year compensation package to CEO Bob Iger
valued at more than $250 million26 in connection with the
value-destructive, but Board endorsed (and unanimously approved),
21st Century Fox acquisition. Furthermore, Ms. Lagomasino’s
background in wealth management appears unrelated to any of
Disney’s businesses and, like Mr. Froman, Ms. Lagomasino possesses
just one skill that is central to Disney’s strategy, according to
Disney’s own analysis.27
We are also asking that you “WITHHOLD” your
vote on the three candidates nominated by Blackwells Capital
LLC.
Together, we can Restore the Magic at
Disney!
Vote using the enclosed BLUE proxy card.
About Trian Fund Management, L.P.
Founded in 2005, Trian Fund Management, L.P. (“Trian”) is a
multi-billion dollar investment management firm. Trian is a highly
engaged shareowner that combines concentrated public equity
ownership with operational expertise. Leveraging the 40+ years’
operating experience of our Founding Partners, Nelson Peltz and
Peter May, Trian seeks to invest in high quality but undervalued
and underperforming public companies and to work collaboratively
with management teams and boards to help companies execute
operational and strategic initiatives designed to drive long-term
sustainable earnings growth for the benefit of all
stakeholders.
Media Contacts:
Anne A. Tarbell(212) 451-3030atarbell@trianpartners.com
Paul Caminiti / Pamela Greene / Jacqueline ZuhseReevemark(212)
433-4600Trian@reevemark.com
Investor Contacts:
Matthew Peltz(212) 451-3060mpeltz@trianpartners.com
Ryan Bunch(212) 451-3176rbunch@trianpartners.com
Bruce Goldfarb / Pat McHughOkapi Partners LLC(212) 297-0720(877)
629-6357info@okapipartners.com
Edward McCarthy / Richard Grubaugh / Thomas GerminarioD.F. King
& Co., Inc. (212) 229-2634 Disney@dfking.com
Disclaimer
Except as otherwise set forth in this press
release, the views expressed in this press release reflect the
opinions of Trian Fund Management, L.P. and its affiliates
(“Trian”), and are based on publicly available information with
respect to The Walt Disney Company (the “Company”). Trian
recognizes that there may be confidential information in the
possession of the Company that could lead it or others to disagree
with Trian’s conclusions. Trian reserves the right to change any of
its opinions expressed herein at any time as it deems appropriate
and disclaims any obligation to notify the market or any other
party of any such change, except as required by law. Trian
disclaims any obligation to update the information or opinions
contained in this press release, except as required by law. For the
avoidance of doubt, this press release is not affiliated with or
endorsed by Disney.
This press release is provided merely as
information and is not intended to be, nor should it be construed
as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any
security nor as a recommendation to purchase or sell any security.
Funds, investment vehicles, and accounts managed by Trian currently
beneficially own shares of the Company. These funds, investment
vehicles, and accounts are in the business of trading – buying and
selling – securities and intend to continue trading in the
securities of the Company. You should assume such funds may from
time to time sell all or a portion of their holdings of the Company
in open market transactions or otherwise, buy additional shares (in
open market or privately negotiated transactions or otherwise), or
trade in options, puts, calls, swaps or other derivative
instruments relating to such shares.
Some of the materials in this press release
contain forward-looking statements. All statements contained herein
that are not clearly historical in nature or that necessarily
depend on future events are forward-looking, and the words
“anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “potential,” “could,”
“opportunity,” “estimate,” “plan,” “once again,” “achieve,” and
similar expressions are generally intended to identify
forward-looking statements. The projected results and statements
contained herein that are not historical facts are based on current
expectations, speak only as of the date of these materials and
involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause
actual results, performances or achievements to be materially
different from any future results, performances or achievements
expressed or implied by such projected results and statements.
Assumptions relating to the foregoing involve judgments with
respect to, among other things, future economic competitive and
market conditions and future business decisions, all of which are
difficult or impossible to predict accurately and many of which are
beyond the control of Trian.
The estimates, projections and potential impact
of the opportunities identified by Trian herein are based on
assumptions that Trian believes to be reasonable as of the date of
this press release, but there can be no assurance or guarantee (i)
that any of the proposed actions set forth in this press release
will be completed, (ii) that the actual results or performance of
the Company will not differ, and such differences may be material,
or (iii) that any of the assumptions provided in this press release
are accurate.
Important Information
Trian Fund Management, L.P., together with
Nelson Peltz, Peter W. May, Josh Frank, Matthew Peltz, Isaac
Perlmutter, James A. Rasulo, Trian Fund Management GP, LLC, Trian
Partners, L.P., Trian Partners Parallel Fund I, L.P., Trian
Partners Master Fund, L.P., Trian Partners Co-Investment
Opportunities Fund, Ltd., Trian Partners Fund (Sub)-G, L.P., Trian
Partners Strategic Investment Fund-N, L.P., Trian Partners
Strategic Fund-G II, L.P., Trian Partners Strategic Fund-K, L.P.,
The Laura & Isaac Perlmutter Foundation Inc., Object Trading
Corp., Isaac Perlmutter T.A., and Zib Inc. (collectively, the
“Participants”) filed a definitive proxy statement and accompanying
form of blue proxy card (the “Definitive Proxy Statement”) with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on February 1, 2024
to be used in connection with the 2024 annual meeting of
shareholders of the Company.
THE PARTICIPANTS STRONGLY ADVISE ALL
SHAREHOLDERS OF THE COMPANY TO READ THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT
AND OTHER PROXY MATERIALS BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT
INFORMATION. SUCH PROXY MATERIALS ARE AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE ON THE
SEC’S WEBSITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV AND TRIAN’S WEBSITE,
HTTPS://RESTORETHEMAGIC.COM. THE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND
ACCOMPANYING PROXY CARD WILL BE FURNISHED TO SOME OR ALL OF THE
COMPANY’S SHAREHOLDERS. SHAREHOLDERS MAY ALSO DIRECT A REQUEST TO
EITHER OF TRIAN’S PROXY SOLICITORS, OKAPI PARTNERS LLC, 1212 AVENUE
OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 10036 (SHAREHOLDERS CAN E-MAIL
INFO@OKAPIPARTNERS.COM OR CALL TOLL-FREE: (877) 629-6357), OR D.F.
KING & CO., INC., 48 WALL STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10005
(SHAREHOLDERS CAN E-MAIL DISNEY@DFKING.COM OR CALL TOLL-FREE: (800)
207-3158).
Information about the Participants and a
description of their direct or indirect interests by security
holdings or otherwise can be found in the Definitive Proxy
Statement.
Financials, Wall Street Consensus estimates, share price,
ownership, and Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) data referenced are
sourced from SEC filings and FactSet unless otherwise noted.1
Please refer to the definitive proxy statement, filed with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission by Trian Fund
Management L.P. and certain of its affiliates and other persons
(“Trian’s 2024 Proxy Statement”), for information regarding the
members of the “Trian Group.” Nelson Peltz beneficially owns Disney
shares worth approximately $3 billion and Jay Rasulo owns Disney
shares worth approximately $658,000, in each case as further
detailed in Trian’s 2024 Proxy Statement.2 Based on closing prices
of $201.91 and $93.06 on 03/08/21 and 01/26/24, respectively, and
approximately 1.8 billion shares outstanding.3 Disney was one of
the last eight companies in the S&P 500 to restore a dividend
that was cut during the pandemic. Barron’s article titled “Disney’s
Dividend Won’t Be Coming Back Any Time Soon,” by Lawrence C.
Strauss published on 01/20/23.4 Represents aggregate dividend
payments assuming Disney continued to pay a semi-annual dividend of
$0.88 per share – equivalent to the last dividend per share paid
before it was suspended – from July 2020 through December 2023 (8
payments in total, adjusted for the $0.30 dividend declared on
11/30/23), multiplied by approximately 1.8 billion shares
outstanding.5 Disney relative performance measures TSR through
10/06/23 defined as the total return an investor would have
received if they purchased one share of stock on the first day of
the measured period, inclusive of share price appreciation and
dividends paid. 10/06/23 represents the trading day prior to the
WSJ article titled “Nelson Peltz Boosts Disney Stake, Seeks Board
Seats,” by Lauren Thomas and Robbie Whelan reporting on Trian’s
increased beneficial ownership in Disney shares and expected
request for Board representation; “other media and entertainment
companies” represents the simple average of “Media Industry Peers”
as defined in Disney’s 2024 Preliminary Proxy Statement and
consists of Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Comcast, Meta, Netflix,
Paramount, and Warner Bros. Discovery; the S&P 500 is
highlighted here only as a widely recognized index, however, for
various reasons the performance of the index and that of the
securities mentioned above may not be comparable. One cannot invest
directly in an index.6 See endnote 5 above. “Disney’s self-selected
media peers” represents the simple average of “Media Industry
Peers” as defined in Disney’s 2024 Preliminary Proxy Statement
filed on 01/16/24 (“Disney’s 2024 Preliminary Proxy Statement”) and
consists of Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Comcast, Meta, Netflix,
Paramount, and Warner Bros. Discovery.7 Source: Adam Bentz, Screen
Rant, “Disney Caps Off Disappointing 2023 By Losing Top Spot At
Global Box Office” published on 01/03/24.8 IMDB; Variety article
titled “Thanksgiving Box Office: ‘Hunger Games’ Pulls Ahead of
Disney’s ‘Wish,’ ‘Napoleon’ Outpacing Projections,” by J. Kim
Murphy and Michaela Zee published 11/25/23; Variety article titled
“‘The Marvels’ Ends Box Office Run as Lowest-Grossing MCU Movie in
History,” by Rebecca Rubin published 12/03/23; Variety article
titled “Why Didn’t Disney Save ‘Haunted Mansion’ for Halloween,” by
Rebecca Rubin published 07/31/23; Variety article titled “Big
Budgets, Big Headaches: Why ‘Indiana Jones 5’ and ‘Mission:
Impossible 7’ are Struggling to Make a Profit,” by Rebecca Rubin,
Brent Lang, Matt Donnelly published 08/15/23; Variety article
titled “Disney’s Harsh New Reality: Costly Film Flops, Creative
Struggles and a Shrinking Global Box Office,” by Rebecca Rubin,
Brent Lang published 07/05/23.9 “Profit” refers to operating
income. Netflix and Disney revenue and operating income represent
each company’s fiscal year (“FY”) 2023 financials. Disney
Direct-to-Consumer revenue and operating income adjusted to include
an allocation of corporate expense based on pro rata share of
Disney’s FY 2023 revenue.10 Includes operating losses from Disney+,
Hulu and ESPN+.11 Disney’s Sports segment operating profit declined
-9% between FY 2022 and FY 2023.12 CNBC article titled “A Disney
World ticket was $3.50 in 1971—here’s how much it cost the year you
were born,” by Jade Scipioni published 08/09/19, and the Walt
Disney World Admission website, available at:
https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/admission/tickets/. Current price
as of January 26, 2024.13 Disney announced on 09/19/23 that it is
“developing plans to accelerate and expand investment in its DPEP
segment, to nearly double, as compared to the previous
approximately 10-year period, consolidated capital expenditures for
the segment over the course of an approximately 10-year period to
approximately $60 billion in aggregate” which equates to an annual
average capital expenditure of ~$6 billion as compared to Disney’s
prior 10-year historical average of ~$4 billion of reported
“investments in parks, resorts and other property.”14 Represents
the change in Disney’s reported total segment operating income,
diluted EPS from continuing operations, and free cash flow between
FY 2018 and FY 2023.15 Represents the aggregate publicly disclosed
compensation (from respective SEC filings) awarded for director and
officer roles of Disney’s non-management directors earned excluding
Disney-related director compensation.16 Per FactSet ownership and
transaction detail, only two of Disney’s non-management directors
have made open market purchases of Disney stock.17 Robert A. Iger
stock sold represents the cumulative net value of Disney shares
sold based on Form 4 filings and Disney’s 2024 Preliminary Proxy
Statement.18 Source: SEC filings, FactSet. Note: Since 2011, only
one company in the S&P 500 has received more Say-on-Pay votes
below 70% than Disney’s six. “Vote” indicates “For” votes as a
percentage of votes “For” and votes “Against.”19 See Endnote 1
above. 20 For instance, at The Procter & Gamble Company
(“P&G”), a household products company where Mr. Peltz served on
the Board from 2018 until 2022, he helped P&G develop and
oversee a “Four-Year Overhaul” that resulted in P&G “making
several dramatic changes to help improve performance” and
“streamlin[ing] its operations from 10 business units to six,
improv[ing] its earnings growth, clear[ing] out bureaucracy and
increas[ing] accountability.” (Source: Article titled “Peltz to
Depart P&G Board, Capping Nearly Four-Year Overhaul,” published
August 5, 2021 by Bloomberg.) At Mondēlez International, an
international snack company, during Mr. Peltz’s tenure on the board
of directors from 2014 to 2018, the company improved its cash flow
generation through margin improvement and development of working
capital efficiencies. (Source: SEC filings. In 2014, operating
income margins were 11.7% and improved to 16.7% in 2018. Cash flow
from operations were $3.56 billion in 2014 and improved to $3.95
billion in 2018.)21 James A. Rasulo was Chief Financial Officer at
Disney from 01/01/10 through 06/30/15.22 Source: Alex Sherman,
CNBC, "Disney’s Wildest Ride: Iger, Chapek and the Making of an
Epic Succession Mess" published on 09/06/23. See also, Robbie
Whelan, The Wall Street Journal, “The Disney Sequel Bob Iger Never
Wanted” published on 01/24/24.23 Per Disney’s “Director Skills and
Experience Matrix” in Disney’s 2024 Preliminary Proxy Statement
filed 01/16/24, page 14.24 Represents Disney’s cumulative NEO
compensation disclosed in the Summary Compensation Tables from FY
2015 through FY 2023, over which period Maria Elena Lagomasino was
either a member or Chair of Disney’s Compensation Committee. 25
Represents Disney’s share price performance between the end of FY
2015 (10/03/15) through the end of FY 2023 (09/30/23).26 In
connection with Disney’s entry into a definitive transaction
agreement with 21st Century Fox, Disney extended Bob Iger’s
employment agreement through 12/31/21 and significantly increased
his compensation thereunder. From FY 2018 through FY 2021, Bob Iger
received compensation valued at over $250 million (reflecting
Iger’s compensation recorded in the summary compensation table of
Disney’s proxy statements corresponding to each fiscal year plus
the estimated target value of the performance share units granted
in connection with the extension of Iger’s employment agreement,
which were not reflected in the summary compensation table).27 Per
Disney’s “Director Skills and Experience Matrix” in Disney’s 2024
Preliminary Proxy Statement filed 01/16/24, page 14.
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