BA Boeing Co

By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel 

Federal aviation regulators are considering mandatory flight-simulator training before U.S. pilots can operate Boeing Co.'s 737 MAX jets again, according to government and industry officials familiar with the deliberations, a change that would repudiate one of the plane maker's longstanding arguments.

The Federal Aviation Administration months ago rejected the idea -- which would entail extra costs and delays for airlines -- as unnecessary. But in recent weeks, these officials said, requiring such training before returning the grounded U.S. MAX fleet to the air has gained momentum among agency and industry safety experts.

"The deliberations appear headed for a much different direction than before," according to one of the officials, who described increased FAA emphasis on the topic.

The FAA's formal decision isn't expected until February or later, and the situation remains fluid. An agency spokeswoman declined to comment on specifics, saying more analysis and testing is required.

"The FAA does not have a timeline for this process," she said. "And at this point our primary concern is ensuring a complete and thorough review of the aircraft."

A Boeing spokesman said: "We are thoroughly evaluating all aspects of a safe return to service including pilot training, procedures and checklists." He added that Boeing will follow the recommendations of regulators world-wide and its priority is supplying any information they seek.

Boeing has long maintained 737 MAX pilots don't need supplemental simulator training beyond what pilots receive to fly other 737 models, a stance that many FAA officials now regard with increasing skepticism, according to the officials.

The FAA's changed outlook on simulator training has arisen partly because Boeing and regulators are proposing rewriting some emergency checklists for pilots and creating some new ones, according to some of these officials.

In addition, one of these officials said, the FAA expects certain cockpit alert lights to be updated so they can notify crews of potential problems with an automated stall-prevention feature called MCAS. Misfires of that system led to two fatal MAX nosedives in less than five months, taking 346 lives and resulting in global grounding of the planes in March.

Simulator training typically is used to ensure flight crews understand and can respond appropriately to numerous changes in emergency procedures or alerts.

Since at least early fall, regulators in Europe, Canada and some Asian markets have signaled they are leaning toward mandating extra simulator training as part of their independent reviews of the MAX's safety.

The current tentative timeline projects FAA approval of an ungrounding order around March, after a group of international aviators -- called the Joint Operational Evaluation Board -- is slated to issue comprehensive training recommendations. After that, it would take weeks to inspect the idled planes, complete required maintenance tasks, brief foreign authorities and fly demonstration flights without passengers.

At this point, United Airlines Holdings Inc. has said it is considering voluntarily implementing additional flight-simulator sessions for MAX pilots, though no final decision has been made. The airline has taken the MAX out of its schedules through early June. Airlines could point to such a requirement in their efforts to convince the flying public that the beleaguered airliner is safe, some of the officials said.

Complicating the FAA's decision is an industrywide shortage of functioning 737 MAX simulators.

In response, the FAA, Boeing and airlines are considering installing new software in existing 737 NG simulators so they can better mimic the characteristics of MAX jetliners, according to these officials.

Meanwhile, agency chief Steve Dickson, a former airline captain and safety executive, plans to personally test software fixes and training changes as soon as the end of January or early February.

A year ago, when the FAA was analyzing earlier versions of MCAS fixes, Boeing argued strongly against upfront simulator requirements. The company said in a letter to the agency that differences between 737 NG and MAX models relating to the MCAS software "do not affect pilot knowledge, skills, abilities or flight safety." At the time, FAA and Boeing officials tentatively agreed on training sessions that aviators could perform by themselves on tablets or laptop computers.

The correspondence was released in October by the House Transportation Committee, which continues to investigate safety problems that have bedeviled the MAX, along with the FAA's oversight of the plane's initial design and subsequent proposed fixes.

Separately, a broader internal review of the MAX's design by Boeing, extending well beyond software questions, has uncovered a potential safety problem stemming from the location of certain wire bundles inside the tail.

As reported earlier by The New York Times, the spacing of the bundles could cause an electrical short circuit resulting in a possible emergency that would require pilots to respond as quickly as four seconds to prevent the plane from going into a hazardous dive, said people familiar with the details. Various other MAX systems also have been re-examined since Boeing and the FAA in June revised long-held assumptions about pilot-response times.

An FAA spokesman said the agency will ensure that all safety related issues identified during the review process are addressed before the MAX is approved for return to passenger service.

A Boeing spokesman said the company is working closely with regulators on a robust and thorough certification process that includes assessing the safety of the wiring bundles. He added it was premature to say whether this will lead to a design change.

--Alison Sider contributed to this article.

Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

January 05, 2020 17:27 ET (22:27 GMT)

Copyright (c) 2020 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.