TAPP Tap Resources Inc (PK)

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The Funds file their complete schedules of portfolio holdings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) for the first and third quarters of each fiscal year on Form N-Q within 60 days after the end of the period. The Funds’ Forms N-Q are available on the Commission’s website at http://www.sec.gov, and may be reviewed and copied at the Commission’s Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. Information on the operation of the Public Reference Room may be obtained by calling 1-800-SEC-0330.

A description of the policies and procedures that the Funds use to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities, as well as information relating to how the Funds voted proxies relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-month period ended June 30, is available (i) without charge, upon request, by calling 1-866-773-3238; and (ii) on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov.

Dear Fellow Shareholders,

This is the first shareholder letter for the Champlain All Cap Fund, with initial investments made on December 31, 2013. In the first month of operation, U.S. stocks experienced some volatility arising from emerging markets economic turmoil. After strong market performance in 2013 which saw a rise of over 30% across all domestic stock indices, January saw a modest -3.16% decrease in prices as measured by the Russell 3000 Stock Index, overdue after the last year’s exceptional gains. The Fund has performed comparably in its first month, decreasing -3.40%.

Since we have been investing for only one month, we will use this early opportunity to discuss the Fund’s investment process, and how we think about successful investing over the long term. In future shareholder letters, we will provide abundant detail on investment performance, discussions of opportunities and risks in the stock market, and on how your investments are postured.

Defining our Investment Process

The Fund is focused on investing in companies we believe have durable businesses with long-term competitive advantages on which they can capitalize to create wealth over time and those trading at attractive stock prices versus their earnings power and growth prospects. This is a difficult combination of attributes to find in the stock market because good businesses are usually fully (or over) priced and not often offered at the bargain bin. Necessarily, there will be reasons why the share price of an attractive company will have decreased to levels we deem undervalued. There may be short term operating problems, concerns about mounting competitive in-roads, changing investor opinions on forward growth prospects, investor neglect, etc. Our job is to evaluate the reasons why a previously solid company’s share price is trading at a discount. We then select companies for investment where we see an overreaction to fleeting problems, a material misperception of future prospects, or a demonstrated catalyst to address operating problems or business structure which is likely to unlock underlying value. Controversy surfaces opportunity – but only in selective cases. We are looking for operationally durable businesses priced as statistically undervalued – decidedly a value orientation.

We count crucially on the fact that investors habitually under- and over-estimate perceived changes in the long term business prospects of companies based on short term operating variability, and then adjust stock prices widely due to resulting sentiment swings. Wall Street has a continuous need to engineer noise, volatility and ever-changing opinion about individual companies’ prospects. Traders and short-sighted investors act obsessively on such noise, sometimes in vast disproportion to the underlying change in the actual business value and prospects of publicly traded companies. In essence, stock prices often vary much

more widely than the fair or intrinsic value of most businesses – particularly the type on which we will focus our efforts – those with relatively more stable and predictable operations, a proven track record of performance, and a history of focusing on shareholder return and wealth creation. The histrionic actions of many market participants are likely to offer ample opportunity for profitable long term investment in such companies in the future, as they always have in the past.

No one can know the future – of this we can be sure. We invest with the knowledge that we may also make mistakes in our judgments about how our companies will perform. Because we understand very keenly that the most difficult opponent of wealth creation is negative compounding – that is, large or permanent loss of capital – we strive to build conservative assessments, when calculating the fair value of our companies. Price volatility is a part of investing, and this we accept. A conservative valuation bias means we are setting a higher hurdle in the investments we make. Fewer things have to go right for our capital commitment to work out well, and if we are surprised positively and many things go well, that’s great. More important, when we make a mistake and are proved wrong in our investment thesis and valuation, the downside pain may be moderated. Tying this back to the issue of compounding, our goal is to keep losses on our mistakes manageable by conservatively assessing fair value when analyzing all our stocks.

The Fund is structured to be more focused in the number of investments we hold, while allowing for wide flexibility in where we can find opportunities. The Fund is “All Cap” because we can invest in companies of any market capitalization, subject to the process issues defined above. Currently, the Fund is committed mainly in larger capitalization companies. This is where we currently find the most investments exhibiting a combination of attractive valuation and solid business prospects. While we cannot predict with any timing or certainty, we expect the capitalization profile to change over time depending on where opportunities unfold, but it is likely to be at a glacial pace. Flexibility can be a two-edged sword – allowing for more freedom of movement, though not necessarily leading only to positive outcomes. Process discipline and consistency are the crucial underlying factors which can access the benefits of flexibility, while helping to mute the negatives. The field is wider, but the scope we employ to assess investments is the same.

The Fund will hold between thirty and fifty U.S. exchange-traded stocks (including American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and foreign-domiciled companies). We believe this number of holdings strikes a good balance between meaningful commitment to good ideas and diversification. We can own up to 8% of assets at market value in any individual security. Sector exposure can be a maximum of 35% if we find abundant opportunities in one sector, while we may have zero exposure in sectors where valuations are extended and companies do not meet our criteria. In practice, exposure is more balanced as ideas usually arise in all

sectors. Currently, the largest sector exposure is in Health Care at 20% of assets. No Utilities are held. We own 41 companies, with the top ten holdings representing 33% of the Fund.

Finally, we think it is crucial to maintain a long term focus when investing in stocks. Once we have made an investment in a company, we strive to be patient in allowing the opportunity to develop since it is difficult to assess when the benefits may come. As long as progress is evident, even with some inevitable bumps in the road, we stay engaged. We sell mainly for three reasons: the stock price has risen and closed the discount to the fair value of the company, we have made a mistake in the thesis, or there are better competing ideas for the capital. Turnover will be driven by these factors – and not by market trends, fads, sector rotations or consensus opinions which only serve to fuel short term activity in the markets to no enduring benefit. This long term focus naturally aligns our investments in the same “neighborhood” with those of other long-term, value-focused investors who we respect, and who think and invest like business owners. We see the shareholder base of our companies the same way real estate is viewed: buy in a good location and live in a neighborhood that complements one’s style.

Market Commentary

After five years of increasing stock prices from the March 2009 lows achieved during the financial crisis of 2008-09, the range of opportunities to buy stocks at reasonable valuations has diminished greatly. As noted above, we find the most attractive investments available in large- and mega-cap companies (generally over $20 billion in equity market value), while many other areas of the market are largely picked over and fully valued, offering little margin of safety should corporate profits revert from all-time levels existent today. The best opportunities as we assess it are in large blue-chip international franchise companies. Yet, because many investors have become emboldened by years of stock market gains, speculative activity in markets is running high. Smaller concept stocks in health care (mainly biotech) and emerging social media and software stocks, along with consumer discretionary growth favorites, have captured investors’ imagination and been bid to valuation extremes reminiscent of the late 1990’s. The combustible mix of near-zero interest rates and intensifying investor animal spirits is leading to generational excesses in some pockets of the market. Investor fervor in paying elevated valuations even for many economically cyclical or relatively mundane businesses adds to the unease. In this environment of high expectations and full valuations, the investor focused on preserving and enhancing capital over the long term must be especially vigilant. We have this mindset in managing the Champlain All Cap Fund, preferring to own a portfolio of attractively valued companies with stable return prospects, strong cash generation and solid dividend growth prospects. We’re staying “close to shore.”

We look forward to earning your trust and managing a portion of your assets in the years to come.

Sincerely,

Dear Fellow Shareholders,

Please find below the recent and long-term performance for both the Champlain Small Company Fund and the Champlain Mid Cap Fund.

We are pleased to present the above returns (which are the “absolute” or realized returns), and they are as we would expect them to be for such an environment. Although both of your funds are lagging slightly behind the benchmarks in the near-term and 5-year periods, we trust that our shareholders will appreciate how our investment process, which seeks to limit business model risk and valuation risk, is not designed to outpace strong equity markets that are fueled by unrestrained fiscal deficits, virtually free money from the Federal Reserve, and easy access to equity margin debt. Indeed, our process is designed to shun highly cyclical and macro-dependent companies, highly leveraged companies, as well as speculative companies lacking both profits and a high gross margin structure; all of which have benefitted disproportionately from the unprecedented fiscal stimulus and monetary accommodation over the past five years. We have included charts of each Funds’ historical rolling 3-year relative returns (the positive or negative difference between the Funds’ returns and the benchmarks’ returns in nominal terms) by quarter to help shareholders understand that their Funds’ relative returns in recent years have been consistent with our expectations for relative returns to lag somewhat in very strong market environments while adding value in more sedate environments – particularly when the benchmark returns are negative.

Although we don’t have enough history to show the same pattern for the Mid Cap Fund as for the Small Company Fund, our history with separate mid cap accounts which predate the fund does reveal a similar pattern of positive relative performance data points in weak market periods.

The pattern on the charts suggests to us that the execution of our process has been reasonably consistent and thus is potentially repeatable. The Small Company Fund chart also reveals – after a bit of contemplation – our process has historically had less drawdown risk (giving our shareholders a faster time to break even from market peaks). Historically, when our relative returns have been muted or negative, our absolute returns have still been quite strong. Finally, the Small Company Fund pattern of returns suggest that time invested and the value added by our investment process will likely be highly correlated as the value added grows through each full market cycle. Still, we are not entirely satisfied with our results and consider how we might shift the cloud of dots to the right somewhat for both Funds if we make just a few more better decisions in the years ahead than we have made in past years.

Since the lows of early 2009, many investors have embraced the more cyclical and speculative companies believing central banks and Congress have their backs. In general, high quality and high return companies have not outperformed as we would expect them to over time. Indeed, over the past year, investors have begun to pay almost any price for rapid revenue growth in software and potential lottery tickets in biotech in a manner that

resembles the reckless enthusiasm shown for profitless Internet and biotech companies in 1999. While some of our profit taking in 2013 looks premature with near-term hindsight, we sense the current valuations for most of the high flying momentum stocks that contributed so meaningfully to the benchmarks in 2013 are unsustainable. Although we do not expect to keep pace in such strong equity markets as we have experienced over the past 5 years, we do expect a period of strong relative performance down the road when either the music stops for the growth at any price parade or central bank largesse becomes counterproductive – as history suggests will happen eventually for both of these trends. Accordingly, we see absolute and relative financial pain ahead for those now chasing the recent leadership among the small and mid cap growth stocks and for those who place more faith in the ongoing benefits of extreme central bank liquidity than the reliability of the business models they own.

Technology

While the investor expectations built into the valuations of many software companies are probably too optimistic, we continue to find reasonably valued and well-positioned opportunities in the software industry – although outright bargains are hard to come by. The Mid Cap Fund remains exposed to the growth of data and cloud computing with holdings in Informatica, TIBCO Software, and Red Hat. In the Small Company Fund; we started a new position in Blackbaud, the leading provider of software applications designed to help not-for-profit organizations become more efficient with fundraising efforts (donor relationship and website management) as well as basic financial management. We believe the competitive environment is relatively benign for Blackbaud, and we also are encouraged by the ongoing transition to an on-demand or Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) version of their software. We added to Qlik Technologies after the company reduced near-term guidance and adjusted its sales process to capture larger contracts with larger customers. We do not believe the hiccup is related to competitive threats and continue to view Qlik as a unique albeit emerging franchise. We also started a new position in Qualys, a provider of software for network vulnerability assessment with several related security products in development. We are impressed by this company’s strategy to invest in the development of an integrated platform for all of its applications, and encouraged by the roster of partners who install their software as well as the current list of reference clients. Importantly, management’s obsession with being profitable is distinctly refreshing. Qualys and LogMeIn (another Small Company Fund software holding) are both investing to position themselves to benefit from the growing number of contact or connection points that will develop from the Internet of Things tsunami that is developing.

Valuation prompted us to lock up a meaningful percentage gain in Guidewire Software for both Funds. We also banked gains in National Instruments for both Funds because of our growing concerns about the competitive landscape for this company. We continue to like the Programmable Logic Device (PLD) semiconductor market and started a position in Xilinx for the Mid Cap Fund. This new holding combined with existing holding Altera Corp. gives your Mid Cap Fund exposure to the two leading makers of PLDs. Shrinking circuits and time to market pressures for OEMs are enabling PLDs to capture a growing number of opportunities currently served by custom chips (aka Application Specific Integrated Circuits or ASICs).

Industrials and Materials

Both Funds continue to be well-exposed to a number of well-managed and diversified industrial companies. Most of these “portfolio managers” as we call them in the Mid Cap Fund and “emerging portfolio managers” for the Small Company Fund have displayed muted cyclicality and an ability to supplement organic growth with accretive bolt-on acquisitions of businesses with adjacent products or adjacent customers. We are well aware that the shares of these companies have historically acted more cyclical than the business operations would suggest they should. But as patient long-term oriented investors we expect a buy and hold approach with these companies to be more likely to produce excess return than trying to trade in and out of the capital intensive or highly cyclical industrials (e.g. steel making, homebuilding and construction, or basic chemicals). We expect the substitution of capital for labor, demand for more fuel efficient planes and factories, demand for clean and low cost energy as well as the related infrastructure needs, and the productivity gains from sensor, software, and wireless enabled machinery (The Internet of Things that includes remotely accessed software to monitor performance and predict maintenance for all types of machinery from jet engines to oil well lift pumps or satellite enabled agriculture equipments used for very precise planting and application of fertilizer or pesticides) will continue to create attractive growth opportunities for well-managed manufacturing companies. We also are encouraged by our business “mortality” study that indicates over the past 5 and 10-year periods the machinery industry has been a relatively low risk industry from the perspective of the potential for shareholders to incur large losses.

In the Small Company Fund, Kaydon was acquired by the Swedish bearings maker SKF. We also eliminated the positions in Proto Labs and UTi Worldwide. A rich valuation that reflected very high expectations warranted the sale of Proto Labs. We sold UTi Worldwide as part of our ongoing effort to upgrade our holdings. While asset-light logistics business models have historically produced high returns, UTi was not nearly as good of a business as we had anticipated when we first invested a few years ago. In the Mid Cap Fund, we eliminated Pall Corp. because of valuation.

Energy

The near-term supply/demand equation for the oil market remains uncertain in our minds and our confidence in a rising price for oil in the near-term has waned. We see new sources of supply (Mexico, Iran, North American oil shale and tar sands) as well as threats to supply (internal sectarian strife in Iraq and the rapid depletion for newly drilled shale oil wells). We see new sources of demand (e.g. rapid growth in Chinese automobile ownership and increasing internal energy consumption by Saudi Arabia) and threats to demand (aggressive Chinese financial system reform causes China’s economy to decelerate more than expected and faster than expected declining demand from developed economies). Accordingly, over the past year or so, we have been opportunistically using price moves close to our estimated Fair Values to reduce our exposure to this sector. However, should we find well-positioned energy related companies trading at sufficient discounts, we will engage. The cost to develop the marginal supply is historically high and suggests to us that the oil market will inhibit new supply at a price of around $75-80 per barrel if not higher. Accordingly, this is the oil price we are using as we seek to manage the risk of your Funds’ energy holdings. Importantly, the steady decline in the ratio of Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROEI) suggests to us that energy service companies might have more advantaged business models than most Exploration and Production companies. Accordingly, we have recently shifted both Funds’ energy holdings away from Exploration and Production (E&P) companies and more towards companies with problem solving and innovative products and services that also should benefit from the growing complexity of developing oil reserves in shale, deep water, and other harsh environments. Indeed, Forum Energy Technologies and the Mid Cap Fund’s newly acquired Frank’s International both have historically earned a much higher return on capital than many other small and mid cap energy service companies.

Consumer

Your Mid Cap Fund will lose another great consumer franchise when Suntory completes its announced acquisition of bourbon producer Beam Inc. Indeed, we have already sold some of the Mid Cap Fund’s Beam shares at a slight premium to the agreed upon deal price as we do not anticipate another rival bid surfacing. As an offset to this source of funds, we added to the position in spice supplier McCormick and Co. that we reestablished late last summer after the Heinz acquisition was announced. We also used recent overall market weakness to build up a new position in The J.M. Smucker Company as well as to add to the long held position in Kellogg. Your Small Company Fund recently received cash for its Harris Teeter shares and we had already been redeploying some of those expected funds into new positions in B&G Foods and Post Holdings, as well as a sizeable increase in The Fresh Market position. Post has recently expanded its portfolio beyond its iconic cereal brands

(Honey Combs, Honey Bunches of Oats, Great Grains, Grape-Nuts, Shredded Wheat, Raising Bran and Alpha Bits) to include protein bars and drinks, private-label pasta and peanut butter, as well as other foods. B&G Foods primarily owns a portfolio of small, slow growing food and spice brands including Ortega, Polaner, Cream of Wheat, Ac’cent, and Mrs. Dash. However, B&G’s acquisition strategy has shifted toward acquiring faster growing snack foods, including the Pirate Booty and Smart Puffs brands.

Financials

For both Funds, stock selection (asset sensitive community and trust banks and no exposure to REITs) has recently been quite favorable in this sector. While both Funds’ bank holdings are expected to benefit from rising short-term interest rates and/or a steeper yield curve, higher interest rates are not necessary for your Funds’ banks to deliver profitable growth. Indeed, your Funds own high quality banks that generally have low loan to asset ratios, low Non-Performing Assets (NPAs), and high Loan Loss Reserves. While we suspect short-term interest rates may well rise someday and create stress for many financials, particularly credit dependent REITs; we are quite unsure about the timing of any increase. In fact, we would not be surprised to see the recent enthusiasm for asset sensitive banks and fear toward REITs reverse – perhaps meaningfully – if or when we get an inevitable growth scare. Still, we are quite reluctant to be invested for a declining interest rate scenario knowing that such a posture will be quite harmful to capital should interest rates happen to normalize at higher levels someday.

Health Care

The Small Company Fund’s health care holdings have recently lagged markedly due to a process based exclusion of the type of biotech and pharmaceutical stocks we perceive to be highly speculative. A full valuation that reflected high expectations of the new CEO and his acquisition program caused us to eliminate TECHNE. We started a new position in ICU Medical. This provider of infusion and critical care products that help prevent infection earns good returns and has a meaningful surplus of cash on its balance sheet. Prestige Brands, another new holding, owns a portfolio of personal care brands including Goody’s, Luden’s, Little Remedies, PediaCare, Efferdent, Chloraseptic, Clear eyes, and Compound W. Prestige’s strategy is to drive growth through innovative packaging and formulations with these long-established brands and use robust cash flow to deleverage from acquisitions. Recently, liquid and powdered headache medicines from Goody’s have opened up the convenience store channel to several other Prestige brands. We also started new positions in Omnicell – a provider of inventory control and dispensing management systems for medicine and medical supplies – and Globus Medical – a provider of implants and related tools for spinal surgery.

The Mid Cap Fund health care names have fared relatively better partly as a result of the takeover of Life Technologies and outsized gains from Illumina – both providers of DNA sequencing machines and other life science tools and consumables. Although we are quite enthusiastic about Illumina’s technology and competitive position, valuation warranted our sale of the holding. We redeployed capital into Sirona Dental Systems, a maker of Computer Aided Design and Manufacturing systems for crowns as well as a new position in the animal health company Zoetis, a recent spin-off from Pfizer.

While fear, uncertainty, confusion, and errors surrounding enrollment in the Affordable Care Act insurance program are likely to create near-term volatility for utilization/demand; reasonable valuations, demographics, and fixing of the enrollment process should eventually restore consistent utilization/demand and create investor enthusiasm for our type of health care holdings.

Final Thoughts

In past letters we have tried to communicate the idea that an investment process that does not anchor itself to the most reliable companies that produce above-average returns on equity or capital might not be as repeatable or as likely to produce an increasingly obvious excess return over time. From our perspective, too many investors are trying to exploit fleeting anomalies or conditions (e.g. excessive liquidity, artificially low interest rates, currency movements, and price momentum) or difficult to forecast trends (e.g. social media, economic cycle, and interest rate cycle). Thus, we would like to remind investors that we seek to purchase small pieces of reliable high return companies on your behalf with the idea that we are purchasing an ownership stake in a good to very good business – sometimes even a great business. We think a lot about recurring revenue streams and revenues from consumables or spare parts. We avoid highly cyclical and fashion-oriented businesses. We contemplate barriers to entry, brand loyalty, real (net of inflation) pricing power, scale advantages, ability to attract and retain talent, network effects, and other factors that define the durability of any competitive advantage. We also avoid companies that sell products of dubious value or participate meaningfully in declining industries or markets. We would rather own asset light than asset intensive businesses, as they are typically easier to manage, more profitable, and therefore generally less risky. We go into new situations expecting the return to come from the compounding of the shareholders’ equity (book value) in the company and the ability for that company to return capital to its shareholders – not just a return from somebody willing to pay a higher price for the shares. In other words, we look for the business to be the primary factor driving our returns not the stock market. We actually consider the net present value of an estimated cash flow stream that is or will soon become available to shareholders as an important part of our valuation analysis. Indeed,

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while we have a clear bias for good to great businesses, we also are reluctant to pay any price for such companies. Still, we would rather own good to great companies at modest discounts than a marginal business at a steep discount.

On most valuation metrics, small cap valuations are at the high end of their historical range. Indeed, that also is true for your Small Company Fund. However, when including the contribution for non-earners (companies losing money) on a weighted harmonic basis, we believe your Small Company Fund is about half as expensive as the Russell 2000. In recent years, reliable companies with higher than average returns on capital have not been favored by most investors. We continue to believe an investor bias for quality will unfold someday driving the valuations for both of your Funds to distinct premiums to the benchmarks. Indeed, while some market strategists and pundits are calling for a shift in equity market leadership away from small and mid caps toward large caps, we think the bigger more important shift that will develop is a bias for consistently high returns at the expense of market beta, cyclical volatility, and highly leveraged balance sheets. History reveals that Return on Equity (ROE) as well as the compound rate of growth for earnings, book value, and dividends explains long-term equity returns much more than recent equity market trends suggest.

It is a privilege for us to manage a portion of your assets while at the same time managing a meaningful percentage of our own investable assets. We appreciate your continued trust and confidence.

Sincerely,

Scott T. Brayman, CFA

The above commentary represents management’s assessment of the Funds and market environment at a specific point in time and should not be relied upon by the reader as research or investment advice regarding the funds or any stock in particular, nor should it be construed as a recommendation to purchase or sell a security.

Holdings are subject to change. Current and future holdings are subject to risk.

Mutual fund investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. There can be no assurance that the Funds will achieve its stated objectives. In addition to the normal risks associated with investing, investments in smaller companies typically exhibit higher volatility. Current and future holdings are subject to risk. Diversification does not protect against market loss.

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DEFINITION OF THE COMPARATIVE INDICES

Russell Midcap Index measures the performance of the mid-cap segment of the U.S. equity universe. It includes approximately 800 of the smallest securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership.

Russell 2000 Index is an unmanaged index comprised of 2,000 stocks of U.S. companies with small market capitalization.

Russell 3000 Index ^® measures the performance of the largest 3,000 U.S. companies representing approximately 98% of the investable U.S. equity market, based on a combination of the their market cap and current index membership.

*Percentages are based on total investments. Cash equivalents are not shown in the top ten chart.

*Percentages are based on total investments. Cash equivalents are not shown in the top ten chart.

*Percentages are based on total investments. Cash equivalents are not shown in the top ten chart.

SECTOR WEIGHTINGS†:

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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SECTOR WEIGHTINGS†:

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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SECTOR WEIGHTINGS†:

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

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