TIDMCNN
RNS Number : 2765A
Caledonian Trust PLC
28 March 2012
28 March 2012
Caledonian Trust PLC
Unaudited Interim Results
for the six months ended 31 December 2011
Caledonian Trust PLC, the Edinburgh-based property investment
holding and development company, announces its unaudited interim
results for the six months ended 31 December 2011.
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT DECEMBER
Introduction
The Group made a pre-tax loss of GBP633,000 in the six months to
31 December 2011, compared with a loss of GBP101,000 for the same
period last year.
The loss per share was 5.33p compared with a loss of 0.85p last
year and the NAV per share was 152.3p compared with 164.5p last
year. For the year to 30 June 2011 the comparable figures were a
loss of 7.78p and NAV of 157.6p.
Investment property values were revised downwards by GBP250,000.
There was a small profit on the sale of an investment property in
the period. Property revenues were significantly reduced from last
year due to fewer property disposals in the period. Property costs
also reduced in the period but not in proportion to the reduction
in revenue due to costs on empty properties and to higher rates and
other costs. Administrative expenses decreased slightly by
GBP17,000. Financing costs were in line with last year.
No dividend will be paid for the period.
Review of Activities
The Group has continued to invest in enhancing the value of its
development properties by working towards or gaining valuable
planning consents. Some limited development work has also been
undertaken to facilitate disposals and to protect existing consents
by commencing development.
At St Margaret's House, London Road, Edinburgh, our largest
individual property, planning consent in principle was issued in
September 2011 for a 231,000ft(2) mixed use development of
residential and/or student accommodation, an hotel and offices and
other commercial space together with parking for 225 cars. The
existing building continues to be wholly let at a modest rent to
charitable causes. The car parking spaces are let to our
neighbours, the Registers of Scotland, on a short-term lease. Thus
we continue to hold the building with very limited outgoings and
expect to be able to raise the current modest rent year by
year.
In east Edinburgh at Brunstane we hold consent to rebuild and
extend a cottage and to convert a Georgian steading into nine
houses and to convert another period building into a 3,500ft(2)
detached house. We are currently undertaking an initial external
works contract to provide the services infrastructure for the new
development and to improve the services infrastructure serving the
existing five terraced cottages together with other works including
car parking, hard standing and redesign of the gardens. We expect
to let a contract shortly for renovation of the three vacant
cottages in this terrace and other general improvements to the
terrace. An original Georgian cottage, south facing with french
doors to the garden, near a railway station and within the City but
with a country atmosphere, will be a desirable property.
At Strathtay we obtained consent for three new houses, a large
detached house of 7,263ft(2) and two semi-detached "coach houses"
totalling 3,550ft(2) on part of our site in November 2011. At
Ardpatrick Estate we obtained consent in September 2011 for a
single dwellinghouse of 1670ft(2) adjacent to the South Lodge, a
site enjoying wonderful south-facing views over West Loch Tarbert
with a separate detached double garage.
We have recently submitted a new application for five houses on
our site at Myreside in the Carse of Gowrie and will shortly submit
an application for twelve houses on our site at Frithfield six
miles from St Andrews. We have also submitted an application for a
new detached house on the site of Bay Cottage at Ardpatrick.
The investment property at Rosslyn Street, Kirkcaldy, was the
only sale realised in the six months to 31 December 2011. After
negotiations over an extended period the property was sold to the
tenant. As previously reported we had exchanged contracts for the
sale of our site at Baylis Road/Murphy Street, London. The
purchasers' planning consent was approved by Lambeth Council on 20
March 2012 and the sale completed on Monday 26 March 2012. We will
use the proceeds of cGBP2.8m to eliminate the Group bank borrowings
of GBP1.5m, to fund selective small development and to make
opportunistic purchases.
Economic Prospects
UK GDP fell by 0.2% in the three months to December 2011, after
rising 0.6% in the previous three months, to give 0.8% growth for
2011. The NIESR estimate that in the three months to January 2012
the economy continued to contract but in the three months to
February GDP expanded by 0.1%. It seems likely that there will not
be a contraction in the three months to March 2012 and a recession,
two consecutive quarters decline in output, will be avoided. The
NIESR describes the economy as "flat", possibly falling 0.1% in
2012 as a whole, but expects recovery to "take hold" in 2013 -
rising by 2.3%.
Other recent forecasts for the UK economy in 2012 are not quite
so gloomy, although they have almost always been downgraded from
previous levels. The Economist poll of forecasters illustrates a
progressive decline: growth figures for 2012 were forecast as 2.0%
(June), 1.9% (August), 1.6% (September), 1.3% (October), 1.1%
(November), 0.6% (December) and 0.2% January 2012, the current
position. The Treasury "Forecasts for the UK Economy" follow a very
similar pattern, but forecasts 2012 growth to be slightly higher at
0.4%.
The current depression has already lasted longer than the 48
months of the 1930-34 "Great Depression" and the NIESR expect
output to be below the earlier peak in the first quarter of 2008
until about mid 2014, or for 66 months. On the trend established
before the recession the current output is 12-15% lower than it
would have been. The anti-Keynesian economists argue that the
pre-recession rate of expansion was unsustainable and the gap
between actual output and that estimated from the modified trend
line is 6% to 8%. The output gap, the amount an economy could
expect to grow without hitting immediate capacity constraints drops
as productive capacity - plant, technology, skill and labour -
become scrapped, idle or bypassed. The Bank of England concedes
that "the recovery to date has been weak" and states that recovery
will be unlikely until mid-2013, a more optimistic view than most
commentators, and observes that "there exists a sizeable margin of
spare capacity in the labour market". Accordingly, the inflation
risks for any given increase in demand should be limited.
The Bank of England has eased monetary policy far beyond any
previous limit, for a lot longer and with more ingenuity than ever
before. Base rates have been held at a long time low for three
years and the rates implied by market interest rates are that rates
will not rise before 2014. The Bank has also engaged in an
unprecedented asset purchase programme quaintly termed Quantitative
Easing, "QE", of an initial GBP200bn followed by further tranches
of GBP75bn in October 2011 and GBP50bn in February 2012, or
GBP325bn altogether. The Bank estimates that the initial QE of
GBP200bn raised GDP by 1[1/2]% to 2% and inflation by [3/4]% -
1[1/2]% and, if so, it has prevented a "double dip" recession, an
altogether reasonable trade-off, given that the prospect of high
inflation seems muted. It is politically incorrect to observe that
a little extra inflation would be remarkably useful at this
stage!
Patently the monetary stimuli, however beneficial, have not
allowed the economy to resume "normal" growth still less to attain
the higher "catch-up" rate of growth that normally follows a
recession. Indeed the use of QE indicates that base rate reductions
were insufficient in themselves for the desired stimulus. This
occurs because a whole panoply of restrictions pre-empts these
rates being effective in the market place. Libor rates are higher,
margins charged by banks are higher, the conditions imposed on
loans are transformed compared to previously, repayments are
higher, the banks are pricing loans by systematised credit check
rather than knowledge of the credit risk, a contributing factor to
the Great Depression in the USA as described by Ben Bernanke, and,
ultimately, they are rationing the credit as they use loan
reduction as one of several methods of improving their loan to
equity ratios, as required by the new regulations. These are overly
conservative for the current difficult times - a case of closing
the credit stable doors after the bad loans have already been made,
or otherwise bolted.
Access to bank credit is relatively more important for SMEs than
for larger companies. The Bank says "small businesses are more
reliant on bank borrowing because they are unable to substitute
away from bank funding by accessing alternative (sic!) sources of
capital market finance". Since late 2009 lending has been declining
- about 2% pa increasing to about 7% pa in late 2011. This rate of
contraction masks two significant points. The 2% contraction in
late 2009 took place immediately after lending had expanded at a
rate of 10% to 14% in 2008. The contraction of 7% in credit to SMEs
in 2011 is a net figure. Within that net figure there will be a
hardcore of lending which, for whatever reason, the banks choose
not to force recovery. If that is say 50% of lending, then the
reduction in discretionary lending is not 7% but actually 14%. The
precise figures are obviously closely guarded commercial secrets,
but the reduction in available credit in 2011 would have been
significantly above the headline 7% figure.
Monetary policy has been and is at its most expansionary:
all-time low interest rates and extensive open market operations,
as they are termed in the US. While the overall effect has been
dramatic and an increase of 1[1/2]% to 2% ascribed to QE, the
economy is not growing and the SME sector, a key element in any
economic recovery, is starved of funds. QE is being used to buy
financial assets, GBP325bn by the end of the third round,
predominantly government gilts reducing their supply, increasing
their price and reducing their yield to almost all time record
lows. The Bank of England will shortly own almost 1/3 of the gilt
market. The direct effect on the SME loan market is minimal and any
indirect effect via financial intermediaries has been insufficient
to counter other contractory factors. Monetary policy, even used to
extremes, as currently practised has proved insufficient to restore
growth to the UK economy.
Monetary stimulus is being overridden by fiscal contraction. In
the US, where the Great Depression and the searing experience of
mass unemployment and social collapse was patently reinforced by
the restrictive policies of President Hoover who was advised to
"Liquidate labour, liquidate stocks, liquidate farmers, liquidate
real estate ... it will purge the rottenness out of the system",
the Obama administration has followed what Martin Wolf calls a "pro
stimulus" approach to their fiscal policy, as well as an equivalent
expansionary monetary policy. Such a policy is succeeding well. The
March Economist poll of forecasters expects the US economy to grow
2.1% in 2012 and the Economist expects 2.5% which it says "will not
bring the jobless rate down fast [but], it could be the first step
towards a self-sustaining recovery ... " .
The case for some fiscal stimulus such as has been provided in
the US, has been repeatedly put by Martin Wolf in the FT who quotes
even the conservative IFS as saying the "case for a short term
fiscal stimulus is stronger now than a year ago." A major argument
against a stimulus is the risk to credibility and to the cost of
borrowing. However, as in the US, a sovereign UK presents quite a
different credit risk to a sub-sovereign Eurozone borrower and if
the stimulus is correctly targeted to produce growth it should
result in less borrowing, not more. Last year, to Mr Cameron's
consternation, fiscal cuts perversely led to increased borrowing.
The most suitable fiscal changes should leave the present cuts in
current spending in place, reduce tax charges to encourage demand,
encourage long-term structural and fiscal returns and invest in
immediately available infrastructure projects. Without such
stimulus, recession may be avoided but growth will be low.
Expansionary proposals have many parallels with the US, they are
in contrast to the further fiscal restrictions proposed in the
Eurozone where fiscal contraction is the German medicine prescribed
to cure structural deficits. The Eurozone enjoys a temporary
euphoria after successfully negotiating in Greece the largest
sovereign default in history, GBP100bn, without disrupting the
structure of the Eurozone, but without solving either the problem
of the Greek debt or the Eurozone's inherent inconsistency. The FT
says "The Greek Sovereign debt drama has merely paused for an
interval". The long term problem debts at over 100% of GNP and a
rapidly shrinking non-competitive economy remain. The focus has
been on Greece in spite of its minor significance to the Eurozone -
little more than 2% of GNP - is because it represents an extreme
example of the failings of the Eurozone but, alas, by no means an
unique one.
The troubles in the Eurozone have facilitated a wider
understanding of the inherent inconsistencies of a monetary union
without a fiscal and political union which should be of service to
the Scottish public in the debate over separation. One proposal is
for Scotland to be independent within the Sterling area. Such a
structure exactly mimics the Eurozone structure i.e. a monetary
union without fiscal and political union. If an independent
Scotland wanted to and was permitted to join the Eurozone, it joins
a similarly unbalanced system. A separate currency, as in Norway,
avoids inconsistency but comes at high economic costs. Sadly, much
of the Scottish debate is not well informed. Scotland is a rich
country with a per capita income only 3.8% below that of the UK.
However the economy is 4 percentage points smaller than 4 years ago
and it grew by just 1.6% between Q2 2009 and Q2 2011 against 2.7%
growth in the UK and some similar sized European Union Countries.
Public spending is half of GDP and the fiscal deficit in 2009/10
was 17% of GDP. Scotland could attract a low credit rating, not the
UK's AAA, but say A plus/A1, the same as Slovakia, a nation state
with similarities where the 10 year bond yields 4.5% - a long way
from the UK's 2% to 2.5%. If debt was 80% of GDP, roughly as at
present, then the annual extra cost of the debt to Scotland would
be 1.6% of GDP, almost equal to the GDP growth rate. "Ah", say the
promoters of independence, "Scotland's oil", true, but UK oil
resources are rapidly declining and will fall to 0.2% of UK GDP in
ten years from 0.7% now. Giving Scotland its geographical share
would still have resulted in Scotland having a 10.6% fiscal deficit
in 2010, but a growing one thereafter as output continues to fall.
Of course the exuberance of independence may well release a torrent
of innovation and enterprise but without such a renaissance
economic prospects are at best not improved.
Property Prospects
The IPD Index commercial property returns were 8.1% in 2011,
14.5% in 2010, 2.1% in 2009 and -22.5% in the disaster year of
2008.(201) The 2011 return comprised 6.8% Income return and 1.3%
"Capital" return. Equities returned -3.46% and Gilts an astonishing
26.26%. The "Capital" return peaked in October 2011 and then fell
back marginally to December 2011 and has continued to decline
subsequently. The CBRE All Property Yield in November 2011 was 6.1%
a nominal 0.1 percentage point yield drop in the year. However the
10 year Gilt Yield dropped 1.4 percentage points in November 2011
to 2.0% an all time low, 4.1 percentage points lower than the All
Property Yield. At the market peak in May 2007 it was 4.8% compared
to the current 6.1%, or equivalent to a fall in value of 21.3%
assuming unchanged rents. The All Property Rent Index was 188 in
May 2007 compared to 169 in November 2011, which with the yield
change is equivalent to a drop of 29.3% in value since the peak.
Over the year there were no significant differences among the
different property sectors in either yield or rental changes.
The immediate prospects for commercial property seem
unfavourable. The total expected return for 2012 derived from
derivatives on 18 March 2012 is nil! The February 2012 IPF UK
Consensus Forecast shows a marked downturn from the already poor
forecasts of November 2011. Forecast total returns are now 1.6%,
6.4% and 7.8% for 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively, the 2012
forecast being revised down from 4.5% to 1.6% in February. All
Property Capital Values are forecast to fall 4.6% in 2012 almost
sufficient to offset the 6.2% income return. Rental value is
forecast to fall 0.80%. Capital values are not forecast to change
over the five years to 2016, and rents are forecast to rise by only
1% per year until 2016.
I repeat what I said in my December statement "I see no recovery
in the investment property market until there is a prospect of
"normal" economic growth. In due course there will be a cyclical
recovery. However, the investment market will continue [to
experience] a secular erosion caused by the factors previously
enumerated, particularly technical obsolescence, loss of locational
primacy and competition from new formats."
House prices changed little in 2011, following little change in
2010. In 2011 Nationwide reported a rise of 1%, Halifax a fall of
1.3% and LSL Acadametrics a fall of 0.5% in England & Wales.
LSL observes that the England & Wales market is strongly
influenced by London prices which rose 2% in the year and masked a
2% fall outside London with some areas, such as the North, falling
4% or more.
Figures for Scotland are varied. LSL reports a 1.9% drop,
equivalent to England & Wales without London, and Savills a
fall of 0.8%, but Lloyds TSB, averaging the four quarters of 2011
and comparing them with the previous four quarters, reports prices
have dropped by 4.2%. The ESPC survey, however, shows that while
prices in the three Lothian councils areas surrounding Edinburgh
are down by up to 11.1% (West Lothian) and flats in peripheral
Edinburgh have fallen, Central City and Suburban prices have risen,
as has the average price in Edinburgh. Lloyds TSB, like the other
mortgage providers only reports prices from its own mortgage book,
but LSL's coverage is comprehensive.
Forecasts for the UK housing market are reported monthly in the
Treasury "Forecast of the UK economy". Before the 2011 Autumn
statement a "rounded" average was for a 1% rise in 2012, but this
has fallen steadily and the February report forecasts a fall of 1%.
Savills are much more pessimistic and expect a 4% fall: indeed they
forecast no rise in 2013 or 2014 and only 0.5% in 2015, with a fall
of 1.6% overall in the 5 years to 2016. However, in "Prime
Edinburgh" the market is expected to be much better, rising 9.2%
over the five years to 2016, a similar distinction possibly arising
between the Capital and the rest of Scotland that exists between
London and the rest of the UK.
The performance of the economy will be the main determinant of
the house market. Low economic growth will give higher unemployment
and more house repossessions increasing housing supply. Demand will
be constrained by rationed finance, shortage of capital and lack of
confidence. Properties appealing to "outside" buyers may however go
up in price. Overall I expect a continued decline in house prices
in 2012 unless the current fiscal policy is modified.
Conclusion
We are continuing to endure the longest documented depression in
history, longer than the "Great Depression" of the 1930s. The depth
of the recession has been limited by the intervention of the
authorities, which, although originally late and tentative, has
been comprehensive and has proved effective in returning the
economy to limited growth. Barring exogenous shocks, such as an all
out war in the Middle East, or a "major" Eurozone crisis, the main
variables determining the length of the depression are the supply
of credit, the extent of any short term fiscal stimulus given to
the economy and the rate of removal of industrial, social and
institutional barriers to growth. Scotland traditionally had a
large state sector which will expand with any further transfers of
powers, and, while this may provide desired social benefits, will
be at the expense of economic growth.
Notwithstanding current and prospective constraints there will
be profitable trading opportunities. There are also opportunities
to acquire properties on favourable terms and we will continue to
try to effect participation arrangements which will allow us to
exploit our market knowledge and planning skills. The sale of
Baylis Road has released funds for such uses and makes the Group
wholly independent of bank finance. The continued reduction in
house construction, particularly of family homes, will reduce their
supply, while unfulfilled demand continues to increase. A large
proportion of our prospective sites are targeted at this
market.
In our existing portfolio most development properties are valued
at cost, usually based on existing use, and, when these sites
obtain consent and are then developed or sold, the considerable
upside value will be realised.
I D Lowe
Chairman 27 March 2012
For further information please contact:
Caledonian Trust plc
Douglas Lowe, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Tel: 0131 220 0416
Mike Baynham, Finance Director Tel: 0131 220 0416
Execution Noble & Co Limited
John Riddell Tel: 0207 456 9191
Harry Stockdale
Consolidated income statement for the six months ended 31
December 2011
Unaudited Unaudited Audited
6 months 6 months Year ended
ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 June
2011 2010 2011
Note GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Revenue from properties 194 355 704
Property charges (179) (200) (368)
____ ____ _____
Net rental and related income 15 155 336
____ ____ _____
Proceeds from sale of trading - - -
properties
Carrying value of trading - - -
properties sold
____ ____ _____
Profit from disposal of trading - - -
properties
____ ____ _____
Other income 79 31 43
Other expenses - - -
____ ____ _____
Net other income 79 31 43
____ ____ _____
Administrative expenses (384) (401) (896)
____ ____ _____
Operating loss before investment
property disposals and valuation
movements (290) (215) (517)
Profit/(loss) on disposal of
investment properties 10 - (273)
Valuation gains on investment
properties - 215 175
Valuation losses on investment
properties (250) - (50)
____ ____ ____
Operating loss before net financing
costs (530) - (665)
Finance income 1 - -
Finance expenses (104) (101) (260)
____ ____ ____
Loss before taxation (633) (101) (925)
Taxation 5 - - -
____ ____ ____
Loss for the financial period
attributable to equity holders
of the company (633) (101) (925)
=== === ===
Loss per share
Basic earnings/(loss) per share
(pence) 4 (5.33p) (0.85p) (7.78p)
Diluted earnings/(loss) per
share (pence) 4 (5.33p) (0.85p) (7.78p)
Consolidated statement of recognised income and expenditure for
the six months ended 31 December 2011
Unaudited Unaudited Audited
6 months 6 months Year
ended ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 June
2011 2010 2011
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Change in the fair value
of equity securities available
for sale - - (1)
____ ____ _____
Net loss recognised directly
in equity - - (1)
Loss for the period (633) (101) (925)
____ ____ _____
Total recognised income
and expense for the period
attributable to equity holders
of the parent (633) (101) (926)
==== ==== ====
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2011
Unaudited Unaudited Audited
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 June
2011 2010 2011
Note GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Non current assets
Investment properties 11,100 16,625 11,650
Plant and equipment etc 36 23 35
Investments 4 5 4
______ ______ ______
Total non-current assets 11,140 16,653 11,689
Current assets
Trading properties 11,215 11,000 11,131
Trade and other receivables 123 169 65
Cash and cash equivalents 444 - 577
______ ______ ______
Total current assets 11,782 11,169 11,773
______ ______ ______
Total assets 22,922 27,822 23,462
______ ______ ______
Current liabilities
Trade and other payables (604) (553) (512)
Interest bearing loans and
borrowings (4,223) (7,716) (1,497)
______ ______ ______
(4,827) (8,269) (2,009)
Non current liabilities
Interest bearing loans and
borrowings - - (2,725)
______ ______ ______
- - (2,725)
______ ______ ______
Total liabilities (4,827) (8,269) (4,734)
______ ______ ______
Net assets 6 18,095 19,553 18,728
===== ===== =====
Equity
Issued share capital 7 2,377 2,377 2,377
Other reserves 2,920 2,920 2,920
Retained earnings 6 12,798 14,256 13,431
______ ______ ______
Total equity attributable
to equity holders of the
parent 6 18,095 19,553 18,728
===== ===== =====
Consolidated cash flow statement for the six months ended 31
December 2011
Unaudited Unaudited Audited
6 months 6 months Year
ended ended ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 June
2011 2010 2011
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Profit/(loss) for the period (633) (101) (925)
Adjustments
(Profit)/loss on sale of investment
property (10) - 273
Investment property valuation
movements 250 (215) (125)
Depreciation - - 9
Net finance expense 103 101 260
____ ____ ___
Operating cash flows before
movements
in working capital (290) (215) (508)
Increase in trading properties (84) (109) (240)
(Increase)/decrease in trade
and other receivables (58) (35) 69
Increase in trade and other
payables 72 57 26
_____ _____ _____
Cash generated from operating
activities (360) (302) (653)
Interest paid (83) (90) (260)
Interest received 1 -
_____ _____ _____
Cash flows from operating activities (442) (392) (913)
_____ _____ _____
Investing activities
Proceeds from sale of investment
property 310 - 4,612
Purchases of plant and equipment (1) (1) (22)
_____ _____ _____
Cash flows from investing activities 309 (1) 4,590
_____ _____ _____
Financing activities
Proceeds from/(repayments of)
long term - 100 (4,175)
borrowings
Increase in other borrowings - - 825
_____ _____ _____
Cash flows from financing activities - 100 (3,350)
_____ _____ _____
Net (decrease)/increase in cash
and
cash equivalents (133) (293) 327
Cash and cash equivalents at
beginning
of period 577 250 250
_____ _____ _____
Cash and cash equivalents at
end of period 444 (43) 577
==== ==== ====
Notes to the accounts
1 This interim statement for the six month period to 31 December
2011 is unaudited and was approved by the directors on 27 March
2012. The information set out does not constitute statutory
accounts within the meaning of Section 434 of the Companies Act
2006.
2 Going concern basis
After making enquiries, the Directors have a reasonable
expectation that the company and the group have adequate resources
to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, they continue to adopt the going concern basis in
preparing this interim statement.
3 Accounting policies
Caledonian Trust PLC (the "company") is a company domiciled in
the United Kingdom
Basis of preparation
The interim statement is prepared applying the recognition and
measurement requirements of IFRSs as adopted by the EU. The company
has elected not to prepare the interim statement in accordance with
IAS 34 as adopted by the EU.
The interim statement does not include all the information
required for full annual financial statements and should be read in
conjunction with the financial statements of the company as at and
for the year ended 30 June 2011 which were prepared in accordance
with IFRSs as adopted by the EU.
The preparation of the interim statement requires the directors
to make judgements, estimates and assumptions that affect the
application of policies and reported amounts of assets and
liabilities, income and expenses. Actual results differ from these
estimates. The accounting policies applied by the company in this
interim statement are the same as those applied in its financial
statements as at and for the year ended 30 June 2011. Copies of the
Annual Report for 2011 are available from the Company's head office
by applying to the Company Secretary.
These policies are expected to apply to the accounts for the
year ending 30 June 2012.
The comparative figures for the financial year ended 30 June
2011 are not the Company's statutory accounts for that financial
year. Those accounts have been reported on by the company's
auditors and delivered to the Registrar of Companies. The report of
the auditors was (i) unqualified, (ii) did not include a reference
to any matters to which the auditors drew attention by way of
emphasis without qualifying their report, and (iii) did not contain
a statement under section 498 (2) or (3) of the Companies Act
2006.
4 Earnings/(loss) per share
Basic earnings/(loss) per share are calculated by dividing the
earnings/(loss) attributable to ordinary shareholders by the
weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the
period as follows:
6 months 6 months
ended ended Year
ended
31 Dec 31 Dec 30 June
2011 2010 2011
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
Loss for financial period (633) (101) (925)
=== === ===
No. No. No.
Weighted average no. of shares:
For basic earnings per share
and for diluted
earnings per share 11,882,923 11,882,923 11,882,923
======== ======== ========
Basic earnings/(loss) per
share (5.33p) (0.85p) (7.78p)
Diluted earnings/(loss) per
share (5.33p) (0.85p) (7.78p)
5 Taxation
Taxation for the 6 months ended 31 December 2011 is based on the
effective rate of taxation which is estimated to apply to the year
ending 30 June 2012. Due to the tax losses incurred there is no
charge for the period.
In the case of deferred tax in relation to investment property
revaluation surpluses, the base cost used is historical book cost
and includes allowances or deductions which may be available to
reduce the actual tax liability which would crystallise in the
event of a disposal of the asset. At 31 December 2011 there is a
deferred tax asset which is not recognised in these accounts.
6 Capital and reserves Share Other Retained
capital reserves earnings Total
GBP000 GBP000 GBP000 GBP000
At 1 July 2011 2,377 2,920 13,431 18,728
Total recognised income
and expense - - (633) (633)
_____ _____ ______ ______
At 31 December 2011 2,377 2,920 12,798 18,095
==== ==== ===== =====
At 1 July 2010 2,377 2,920 14,357 19,654
Total recognised income
and expense - - (101) (101)
_____ _____ ______ ______
At 31 December 2010 2,377 2,920 14,256 19,553
==== ==== ===== =====
At 1 July 2010 2,377 2,920 14,357 19,654
Total recognised income
and expense - - (926) (926)
_____ _____ ______ ______
At 30 June 2011 2,377 2,920 13,431 18,728
==== ==== ===== =====
The other reserves consist of the share premium account and
the capital redemption reserve.
7 Issued share capital
31 December 31 December 30 June 2011
2011 2010
No GBP000 No. GBP000 No. GBP000
000 000 000
Authorised
Ordinary shares
of 20p each 20,000 4,000 20,000 4,000 20,000 4,000
===== ==== ===== ==== ===== ====
Issued and
fully paid
Ordinary shares
of 20p each 11,883 2,377 11,883 2,377 11,883 2,377
===== ==== ===== ==== ===== ====
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
END
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