UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20549
SCHEDULE 14A
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. __)
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Preliminary Proxy Statement
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Definitive Proxy Statement
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Definitive Additional Materials
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Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12
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GENWORTH FINANCIAL, INC.
(Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)
SCOTT KLARQUIST
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if Other Than the
Registrant)
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Scott Klarquist has filed a definitive proxy statement, dated April 19,
2022, and accompanying BLUE proxy card with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to be used to solicit votes against certain director
nominees at the 2022 annual meeting of shareholders of Genworth
Financial, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company").
On April 29, 2022, Mr Klarquist issued the attached letter to
shareholders:
Dear Fellow Genworth Financial, Inc. Shareholder:
The undersigned, Scott Klarquist ("Mr Klarquist", "I" or "me"), currently
owns 50,100 shares of Genworth Financial, Inc., a Delaware corporation
("Genworth", "GNW" or the "Company"), which is more shares than all of our
Company's so-called "independent" directors have purchased during the past
five years combined.
Mr Klarquist has decided to initiate a "Vote No" proxy solicitation
with respect to Genworth's 2022 annual meeting (scheduled for May 19 th) and is urging shareholders to vote to (A) WITHHOLD their
votes with respect to the election of each of Karen E. Dyson, Jill R.
Goodman, Melina E. Higgins and Robert P. Restrepo Jr. (collectively,
the "Compensation Committee Directors") to our Board at the Annual
Meeting [Proposal 1] and (B) vote AGAINST approval of the advisory vote
on Genworth's executive compensation [Proposal 2].
If you have received a WHITE proxy card from Genworth, you can vote in
accordance with the foregoing recommendations-but please make sure to do so
ASAP, as the annual meeting is just a couple weeks away.
Why a "Vote No" campaign against Genworth's Compensation Committee
Directors? Incentives determine outcomes. As Charlie Munger has said,
"Never, ever, think about something else when you should be thinking about
the power of incentives." By far the most important incentives for any
corporate executive are the terms of such executive's short and long-term
compensation.
Unfortunately, Genworth's senior executive compensation appears deeply
flawed and does not, in Mr Klarquist's opinion, properly align the
financial incentives of Genworth's senior executives with those of the
true owners of the company, its shareholders.
Consider the following data points:
1. Per our Company's SEC filings,
Genworth's CEO James McInerney has been awarded $70 million in total
compensation by our Board since he took office on January 1, 2013
through December 31, 2021 (including $30 million in total cash
compensation), while during that period shareholders have suffered a
total loss of approximately 50% on their investment in Genworth stock
(including receiving zero dividends)
. All during a raging bull market, with the S&P 500 up over 200% (plus
dividends)!
2.
In 2011, the top five Genworth executives received a total of $11.5
million in compensation, while last year Genworth's five most senior
executives received $30 million in total, or 2.6X 2011's total
compensation
. This represents an annual increase of over 10% during the 2011-2021
period, despite (A) the consumer price index (or CPI) increasing under 2%
per year during the same time frame and (B) GNW's total shareholder return
(TSR) trailing the S&P 500's TSR during the decade by approximately
300%.
3. During the past five years, despite Genworth's stock price remaining
basically stagnant and the company paying zero dividends,
GNW's 5 most-highly compensated NEOs received in excess of 120% of
their targeted annual cash bonus amounts in
25 out of 25 instances (i.e., 100% "above target" awards)
.
4.
Over the past 5 years, none of the short-term compensation for GNW's
NEOs has been tied to any TSR metric or hurdle
and, prior to 2021, none of GNW's long-term NEO compensation was tied to
GNW's TSR.
5. In 2021, GNW belatedly instituted a TSR component for long-term NEO
incentive compensation, but this applies to just 20% of such compensation
(80% of the 2021-2023 LTI compensation remains untethered to GNW's TSR
versus any relevant benchmark).
6. In demonstrating the Compensation Committee Directors' apparently
uncanny ability to devise new ways to distribute shareholder money to
Genworth's senior executives, the Company's Proxy on Pages 65-66 discloses
that
Genworth (meaning us, the shareholders) not only paid a so-called "Cash
Retention Bonus" of $3,000,000 to Enact's CEO Gupta in 2021 (aren't his
Base Salary plus various cash and stock bonuses retention payments
enough?), but it also paid a so-called "Cash Separation Payment" of
$1,875,000 to Genworth's former COO Schneider, who quit in January 2021
(in return for quitting, Mr Schneider also received a pro-rated annual
incentive payment of $468,750, payments related to health benefits of
$51,374 and accelerated RSU vesting with an aggregate value of $753,719).
7. The Company's Proxy (Page 52) claims that the 2021 short-term incentive
compensation for CEO McInerney was determined "based on the achievement of
the financial and strategic measures indicated below", yet no such
financial or strategic measures, nor any percentage weightings for such
measures for bonus purposes, are listed therein. (In last year's proxy
statement, such measures appeared, but only 34% of the CEO's annual
incentive pay that year was tied to specific financial metrics, while
two-thirds was based on undefined and unmeasured objectives like "Right
Size Organization" and "Close China Oceanwide Transaction OR Implement
Strategic Alternatives" (truly a Pass/Fail test if I've ever seen one!))
Our Compensation Committee Directors also lauded him for "developing
and executing a new strategy after the China Oceanwide transaction" and
decided to grant him a bonus for 2021 equal to 150% of his targeted
amount (why 150%?),
when I believe he should have been reprimanded (not rewarded) by the
Board for allowing the China Oceanwide debacle to drag on so long in
the first place
.
This largesse to company insiders appears all the more insulting to
Genworth shareholders in light of the Company's board backing no less than
17 extensions of the doomed China Oceanwide merger without any ticking
or termination fee (note that Directors Higgins and Restrepo were both
on our Board throughout the entirety of this fiasco)
, resulting in the waste, in Mr Klarquist's estimation, of untold millions
of shareholder funds and thousands of Genworth employee man-hours. While
CEO McInerney and his C-suite friends likely enjoy receiving millions in
cash compensation per year courtesy of the shareholders regardless of
whether the shareholders win or lose (what insider wouldn't?), they
apparently are not willing to bet on their own stewardship of our Company
via our stock.
CEO McInerney, for example, has been dumping GNW shares in recent
months at a staggering pace. Per his SEC Form 4 filings, he sold
150,000 shares on the open market last November 15th and jettisoned
another 150,000 shares on the open market on February 22nd, in addition
to selling an additional 1,005,609 shares on March 1st as part of a PSU
vesting, in each case at a small fraction of Genworth's reported book
value
. In fact, the only insider (including C-suite and board members) who has
bought Genworth stock on the open market in recent years did so precisely
two days after I initiated the process to conduct a proxy campaign against
Genworth's incumbent leadership. Clearly something seems amiss here.
Since I began this campaign, I have received nearly universal positive
feedback from sentient Genworth shareholders. I am referring mainly to
individual shareholders and some smaller funds who (as one told me) watch
GNW stock "like a hawk" because it constitutes a meaningful percentage of
their respective portfolios. Here are some comments I have received:
A. Multiple shareholders have agreed that
Genworth's C-suite compensation is exorbitant and out of line with the
Company's true peers
, rather than the cherry-picked peer group in the Company's proxy statement
that on average is many multiples of Genworth's market cap.
B.
Corporate overhead costs are bloated and could be cut substantially.
One commenter cited a figure of $100 million per year in potential
savings if we simplified Genworth's corporate structure.
In addition, there does not seem to be any emphasis on expense control by
our Company's leadership. (Note that Genworth could have prevented this
entire "Vote No" campaign simply by sending me a few requested shareholder
lists, but instead have decided to spend tens of thousands of dollars of
shareholder money on proxy solicitors, legal teams and other assorted
"helpers" to fight my efforts. Pennywise and pound foolish!)
C.
CEO McInerney appears to be "drunk on his own Kool-Aid" with respect to
his proposed new LTC products.
There is no real market for these products, even if Genworth could get them
approved by regulators. Why squander our Company's precious capital on
speculative "new ventures" after all of the effort made to date to decrease
holdco debt, especially in light of Genworth's atrocious track record on
its legacy LTC book of business?
Sadly, I have yet to receive any substantive feedback from either of
our Company's largest holders, Blackrock and Vanguard (together owning
over 25% of GNW stock), who despite their supposed emphasis on ESG,
apparently don't care too much about the "G" in "ESG" (although they do
seem to care quite a bit about virtue signaling with respect to the "E"
and the "S").
Proper governance, though, is arguably the most important of the three,
because without it the other two are unlikely to reflect our society's
values at any company. Nor have I heard much from the proxy advisors, who
(unlike the sentient Genworth shareholders referenced above) lack
skin-in-the-game and thus are incentivized to either rubber-stamp the
incumbent directors and/or simply pass on a case like Genworth as "too
hard".
Incredibly, when I requested a meeting to discuss my "Vote No"
campaign, a key employee of one of the proxy advisors-who shall remain
nameless-actually thought I was a Genworth employee!
Thank you for your support in my "Vote No" campaign.
I believe that if shareholders band together and oppose the incumbent
Compensation Committee Directors, as well as the advisory vote on
executive compensation, it will send a loud and clear message to our
CEO and Board of Directors that the status quo at Genworth is no longer
acceptable
. VOTE "NO" TODAY!
Sincerely,
Scott Klarquist
CIO, Seven Corners Capital Management, LLC
This regulatory filing also includes additional resources:
gnwletter4292022.pdf
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