By Andy Pasztor and Alison Sider
Striking internal messages released this week by Boeing Co. have
undercut many of the plane maker's defenses of its design and
marketing decisions for the beleaguered 737 MAX jet.
Dating back to 2013, the messages offer stark contradictions
between internal views about the development of the MAX and the
company's public stance. They show Boeing personnel seeking to
minimize the amount of training required for MAX pilots, and trying
to avoid regulatory scrutiny of the plane's automated
flight-control system, a feature that misfired and led to two
crashes in less than five months.
In the more than a year since the first fatal crash of the
aircraft in Indonesia, Boeing has maintained that its dismissal of
extra simulator training for the MAX version of the 737 was based
on objective technical and engineering reasons. However, the
internal communications suggested that adhering to engineering
schedules and cutting operating costs for airlines by avoiding
simulator training often trumped safety considerations.
For airlines, putting pilots through simulator sessions is
expensive and time-consuming. In its competition with Airbus SE,
Boeing made it a selling point of the MAX that it wouldn't require
upfront simulator training.
"The language and the sentiments expressed in these
communications are totally unacceptable. But they do not mean that
Boeing acted inappropriately" in making the case to regulators that
simulator training shouldn't be required for the MAX, a Boeing
official said Friday. The company didn't sacrifice safety or
fundamental airplane design principles to meet that objective, the
official said.
Among the numerous email and instant messages were exchanges
involving Mark Forkner. As the MAX's chief technical pilot, he
aggressively sought to convince some regulators and customers --
even those making a special request -- that extra simulator
sessions for the MAX weren't warranted.
With his co-workers, he emphasized the importance of toeing the
line for business reasons, saying in one message that he could be
blamed for costing the company tens of millions of dollars if he
failed to persuade regulators not to require more advanced
training.
"I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will
not be any type of simulator training required," Mr. Forkner wrote
in a March 2017 message.
"Boeing will not allow that to happen," he said. "We'll go toe
to toe with any regulator who tries to make that a
requirement."
In a February 2018 exchange about nagging difficulties with the
MAX flight simulator, an unidentified employee had a stunning
response: "Our arrogance is our demise."
Mr. Forkner, who is now employed by Southwest Airlines Co.,
continues to undertake projects at the carrier's headquarters in
Dallas, a spokeswoman said Friday. Southwest Chief Executive Gary
Kelly has previously commended Mr. Forkner's work at Southwest,
while declining comment on his Boeing tenure.
The Southwest spokeswoman said Friday that the internal Boeing
messages were disappointing, but that the airline remains confident
of ongoing efforts by the aircraft maker and regulators to resolve
the MAX issue.
A lawyer for Mr. Forkner didn't respond to requests for comment
Friday. His attorney, David Gerger, has previously said that Mr.
Forkner was simply blowing off steam in his comments to colleagues
and that he believed the MAX was safe.
The 737 MAX has been grounded world-wide since March, following
crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that claimed 346 lives and set
off one of commercial aviation's biggest crises. Boeing is under
investigation by federal prosecutors, securities regulators,
aviation authorities and lawmakers. It faces a deluge of lawsuits
from the victims' families. It has suspended production of the MAX,
a move that is already hurting companies and their employees across
the aerospace industry and disrupting travel for passengers.
On Friday, Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc., Boeing's biggest
supplier, said it is planning an initial 2,800 layoffs -- the first
announced job cuts since the plane's grounding -- and indicated
more may come in the future.
The layoffs could make it harder for Boeing to step up MAX
production to meet future demand if Spirit has trouble rehiring
skilled workers. It could also add to the woes of airlines that
have already removed the plane from schedules through June. Flight
cancellations and changes have affected thousands of travelers.
Boeing released the internal messages Thursday night,
accompanied by an extensive apology, in its effort to signal a
more-transparent approach under new management, according to people
familiar with Boeing's strategy. Dave Calhoun, who was recently
installed as chief executive, starts the job on Monday.
The company also has said it now favors requiring pilots to
train in simulators before the MAX returns to service, reversing
its long-held position.
Former Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg, who was ousted last month
after three decades at the company, will receive $62.2 million in
vested incentive awards, stock and retirement benefits. He didn't
receive a severance payment but holds stock options received prior
to becoming CEO that as of Friday were valued at about $18.5
million.
Mr. Calhoun will receive a base salary of $1.4 million, a $7
million bonus tied to returning the MAX to commercial service and
long-term incentives, indicating he plans to remain CEO for an
extended time. The planes are expected to return to the air in
March or April, but there is no clear deadline and earlier
schedules have slipped.
By midday Friday, congressional lawmakers were clamoring for
more Boeing documents and aiming their sights on senior
executives.
Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., Ore.), chairman of the House
Transportation Committee, emphasized that the apparent pressure to
save money and make the MAX more marketable to airline customers
without upfront simulator training didn't come from individual
employees.
"That came from high up in the Boeing corporation," he told
reporters, adding that Boeing released the messages following
negotiations with lawmakers. He said his staff is expected to meet
with Mr. Forkner's lawyer next week to discuss his testifying
before the committee, which is investigating the MAX crisis.
In releasing the messages, Boeing said they contained
provocative language but said: "We have made significant changes as
a company to enhance our safety processes, organization and
culture." Without elaborating, the statement indicated employees
could be punished as a result of the messages.
After the first crash in late 2018, Boeing officials said the
company had opted years earlier against disclosing more to aviators
about MCAS, the MAX's powerful new stall-prevention feature, in
order to avoid inundating them with information that wasn't
useful.
"When Boeing developed its training and materials, it followed a
process that was absolutely consistent with introducing previous
new airplanes" and new models, a spokesman said late last year.
The company has remained steadfast that it didn't intentionally
withhold relevant information, even as pilots have criticized it
for not providing details or training on MCAS.
"No one was hiding anything," Mr. Calhoun told CNBC in November,
when he was Boeing's board chairman. "It was a set of engineering
decisions that ended up being wrong."
Minutes from a 2013 meeting, however, indicate some Boeing
executives already were concerned at that early stage that MCAS
might trigger additional training requirements if regulators
focused on its details. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new function
there may be a greater certification and training impact,"
according to the minutes.
Attendees at the meeting resolved to continue referring to the
system as MCAS internally, but to describe it as an addition to an
existing system when discussing it with regulators -- apparently to
shield it from attention. A Boeing employee designated to act on
behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration signed off on that
decision, according to the minutes.
The cynical and deceptive tone of some of the messages has
shocked many industry veterans. "It's certainly not the Boeing I
knew, dealt with and have tremendous respect for," Ray Valeika,
former head of engineering and maintenance at Delta Air Lines Inc.,
said on Friday.
In the wake of the crash in Indonesia, the aviation world
started learning about MCAS. In a meeting with American Airlines
pilots soon after the accident, Boeing executives expressed
confidence that well-trained pilots following established
procedures could respond safely to the scenario the Lion Air crew
had encountered.
During the period when the MAX training requirements were
established, Boeing employees had dissuaded some airlines from
having their pilots receive extra training in simulators before
flying the jet, according to some of the internal messages.
One of those pushing for extra training was part of the Lion Air
group of airlines, according to a June 2017 exchange between Boeing
employees, whose names were redacted.
"I'm trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! Idiots," an
unnamed employee wrote.
The next day, Mr. Forkner, identified by title, tried to
dissuade an airline from opting for more simulator training in an
email, writing to an unnamed official that there was "absolutely no
need" for such training...Boeing does not understand what is to be
gained by a 3 hour simulator session." The airline's name is
redacted but one message in the exchange refers to the time in
Jakarta, where Lion Air is based, for scheduling a meeting.
The message apparently had an effect. The following day, in an
email to a Boeing colleague, Mr. Forkner was jubilant about getting
the carrier to change course.
"Looks like my jedi mind trick worked again! These are not the
droids you're looking for," he said.
Some employees took swipes at regulators, including one who
described a slide show for regulators aimed at demonstrating
similarities between the MAX and a previous version of the 737. The
employee said: "It was like dogs watching TV."
--Doug Cameron contributed to this article.
Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Alison Sider
at alison.sider@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
January 10, 2020 20:58 ET (01:58 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2020 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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