By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
U.S. aviation regulators have launched a high-priority review of
the safety analyses Boeing Co. performed over the years -- and what
information it distributed to airlines -- regarding potential
hazards associated with a new automated flight-control system
introduced on the latest versions of workhorse 737 aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Administration, after roughly two weeks of
declining to comment on any facet of last month's Lion Air jet
crash in Indonesia, which killed all 189 people on board and
involved a 737 MAX 8, released a statement Tuesday saying it was
reviewing details surrounding the safety data and conclusions the
Chicago plane maker previously provided the agency as part of
certifying 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9 models.
The statement also indicated that agency officials are looking
into training requirements for pilots.
The review is part of the overall investigation into the Lion
Air crash.
Signaling that future regulatory action and generally stepped-up
oversight of Boeing's risk-assessment procedures are coming, the
statement said, "the FAA and Boeing continue to evaluate the need
for software and/or other design changes," including "operating
procedures and training as we learn from the ongoing" crash probe
headed by Indonesian authorities.
The statement is the clearest sign yet of internal FAA concerns
stemming from preliminary clues about why the twin-engine aircraft
plunged in the Java Sea at a steep angle and high speed.
A Boeing spokesman said, "While we can't discuss specifics of an
ongoing investigation, we have provided two updates for our
operators around the world that re-emphasize existing procedures
for these situations."
When Boeing opted to install the new flight-control feature,
according to government officials, the company concluded it was
virtually impossible for a combination of sensor failure, pilot
actions and automated nose-down commands by the new system to
result in a serious safety hazard.
But now, with preliminary crash data indicating the plane
experienced just such a sequence of events before crashing, the
company's risk analyses and decision making are under heightened
public scrutiny. So, too, is the oversight of the FAA, which agreed
to allow three U.S. airlines start flying the new models without
Boeing providing cockpit crews or airline officials details about
how the new flight-control system operates and what risks it may
pose under unusual circumstances, by automatically and strongly
pushing down an aircraft's nose.
Investigators haven't determined the cause of the Lion Air
crash, and safety experts cautioned it is too early to tell
precisely how large a role the new flight-control system played in
the tragedy. But as more clues emerge and crash investigators delve
deeper into design issues and the interplay of various computerized
systems and cockpit displays, more of the focus is shifting to the
assumptions of those initial Boeing safety assessments.
More than 200 737 MAX planes have been delivered to airlines
world-wide, including U.S. carriers Southwest Airlines, American
Airlines and United Airlines. That represents a fraction of the
thousands of 737s in use.
Indonesian investigators are still searching for the plane's
cockpit-voice recorder, which could contain vital information about
what the pilots saw and did as they wrestled with a suspected
flurry of sometimes conflicting electronic warnings, unreliable
air-speed displays and a seemingly uncontrollable aircraft gaining
speed as it hurtled toward the water. Investigators and safety
experts have said that after a certain point, the crew may have had
only seconds to react appropriately.
A Nov. 10 memo from Southwest management to its pilots, which
was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, indicated Boeing omitted
information from flight manuals about the new flight-control system
because pilots weren't likely to find themselves in situations
involving some of its features. The flight control system, among
other things, is intended to prevent pilots from stalling the
aircraft.
Shortcomings in Boeing's risk-analysis procedures previously
prompted major regulatory, financial and public relations headaches
for the company. It initially failed to recognize or counteract
potentially fire-prone rechargeable lithium batteries installed on
Boeing's flagship 787 aircraft. All of the jets were temporarily
grounded until Boeing and the FAA agreed on a foolproof fix.
Pilots unions have complained publicly that before the Lion Air
plane went down, they hadn't received any meaningful information or
training regarding the new flight-control system.
In the past, Boeing has had other instances when it wasn't fully
transparent with pilots. When the company revised some software
years ago to prevent crews of some 767 models from accidentally
slamming aircraft tails on the runway during takeoff, it didn't
inform pilots about the change, according to one person familiar
with the details.
Besides the specifics of the safety reviews connected to the
Lion Air crash, the accident could have broader implications for
the way the FAA approves new aircraft models and the complex
computer systems that increasingly control equipment on board.
The agency for some time has been moving to delegate more
responsibility to plane and equipment manufacturers for conducting
detailed risk assessments on new or derivative products. Congress
has been pushing FAA leaders in the same direction, partly to save
federal dollars and partly to speed and streamline regulatory
requirements for industry.
But the Lion Air crash is bound to rev up debate over whether
the FAA granted Boeing excessive leeway -- and then failed to
independently validate the company's conclusions -- regarding
potential unintended consequences and hazards with the new
flight-control system.
In its Tuesday statement, the FAA said it is currently reviewing
each of the individual safety assessments Boeing performed and then
passed on to the FAA, covering each computerized system that
receives data from what is called an angle-of-attack indicator.
Those sensors, one of which is suspected of malfunctioning on the
flight that crashed, measure the angle at which a plane's nose and
wings are raised or lowered. Incorrect angle-of-attack data can
result in faulty airspeed displays, false stall warnings and other
problems that could be misinterpreted by pilots.
Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Andrew Tangel
at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
November 13, 2018 23:20 ET (04:20 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2018 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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