NEW YORK, April 18 /PRNewswire/ -- On March 7, 2008, Greenlight Capital submitted a shareholder proposal (the "Shareholder Proposal") to MI Developments Inc. (NYSE:MIM). The Shareholder Proposal is simple. It merely asks that MI Developments Inc. ("MID") shareholders vote to have the Board implement value-enhancing proposals the Board itself developed and adopted back in May 2005 (the "Board Resolutions"). The Board Resolutions, which Frank Stronach and the Board unanimously approved, included steadily increasing MID's financial leverage, regularly increasing dividends, repurchasing MID shares and rationalizing MID's relationship with Magna Entertainment Corp. ("MEC"). Unfortunately for MID shareholders, the Board Resolutions have not been implemented. According to MID's management proxy circular, Mr. Stronach has told MID that he will vote down the Shareholder Proposal, and will vote his MID shares against the very same Board Resolutions that he voted for three years ago. Surprisingly, after Greenlight submitted the Shareholder Proposal, Mr. Stronach proposed a reorganization of MID which includes many of the very same components as Greenlight's Shareholder Proposal, including a significant increase in MID's leverage, paying out 80% of MID's available annual cash flow to shareholders, returning excess capital to shareholders and disposing of MID's interest in MEC. MID's proxy circular even states that Mr. Stronach's proposal "address[es] many of the issues raised by Greenlight." "So, why is Mr. Stronach now in favor of these components in his proposed reorganization, but not in favor of the Board Resolutions?", asked David Einhorn, President of Greenlight Capital. "The answer is very clear. The Stronach proposal contains a multi-hundred million dollar payoff for Mr. Stronach, and the Board Resolutions do not." The message to the MID shareholders is loud and clear. If Mr. Stronach is richly paid off, he is willing to implement the Board Resolutions and change MID's structure. But, if Mr. Stronach does not receive a payoff amounting to the vast majority of the unlocked value, the value destruction at MID will continue until the shareholders surrender to him. Already, several large MID shareholders have decided to do just that. However, a simple majority vote is not sufficient to approve Stronach's coercive plan. The proposed reorganization requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of each class of shares voted at the MID shareholder meeting. Mr. Stronach does not have enough MID shareholders to achieve this required level of support. The MID shareholders can still stop the proposed reorganization by voting against it. It is worth noting that the Special Committee of the MID Board, which is supposed to be free of Mr. Stronach's influence when it comes to Stronach related-party transactions, has refused to recommend that the MID shareholders vote in favor of the Shareholder Proposal despite the fact that the Board unanimously approved the Board Resolutions back in 2005. Is the MID Board truly independent when it comes to Stronach-related transactions? Clearly, the Board can do its job and implement the steps to unlock MID's long-term shareholder value without making an outrageous payoff to Mr. Stronach. However, because of Mr. Stronach's undue influence and iron-fisted control of the Board, it appears unwilling to do so, and, in fact has failed to do so over the last three years. Instead, it simply falls back to a general statement that the Shareholder Proposal "does not accurately describe the recommendation ... " without specifying any inaccuracies. The Board gives no credible explanation why it has failed to raise the dividend a single time and has been unable to increase leverage over the last three years. It tries to blame the difficult capital markets and economic slowdown, which commenced only a few months ago, and the "Greenlight litigation." The Board gives no explanation as to how the litigation prevented it from implementing its own recommendations -- other than as a result of Mr. Stronach's retaliation and his attempt to hold MID hostage until its shareholders capitulate. Greenlight intends to vote all of its shares in favor of the Shareholder Proposal and against the proposed reorganization, and urges all other MID shareholders to do the same. DATASOURCE: Greenlight Capital CONTACT: Steve Bruce, Mary Beth Grover, or Monica Everett, all of Abernathy MacGregor, +1-212-371-5999, for Greenlight Capital

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