By Greg Ip
President Donald Trump is steering U.S. economic policy in a
radically new direction. From trying to revive steelmakers with
tariffs to vetoing Chinese technology investments, he is using the
federal government to direct which industries prosper and which
don't.
Many countries have long tilted the playing field toward favored
companies and industries, a practice economists call industrial
policy. American presidents have traditionally resisted this as
"picking winners."
The president has broken with that tradition, unveiling a series
of actions on trade, foreign investment and energy he hopes will
revive favored industries and beat back the competitive challenge
of other countries -- but which risk creating domestic losers.
His administration pushed strongly for a bill Congress is about
to pass significantly expanding Washington's power to scrutinize
foreign investment and transactions that could compromise U.S.
technological leadership.
These aren't easily labeled a single, coherent policy because
they reflect a mix of motives: nostalgia for America's past
industrial greatness, devotion to Mr. Trump's electoral base and
deep suspicion of China. What they do share is a willingness to
override private business and investor decisions in the interests
of national security, as Mr. Trump defines it.
Whether they will work is another question. The premise of
industrial policy is that the private market doesn't fully value
all the benefits some companies and sectors bring the country:
their contribution to national security, or to innovation and
knowledge that spills over to the broader economy.
In practice, industrial policy goes in one of two directions:
one is to prop up mature industries, as Mr. Trump seeks to do with
steel and coal. Economists think such efforts cost taxpayers and
consumers dearly without altering an industry's long-run
fortunes.
The other is to give new industries a leg up against foreign
competition. This is what Mr. Trump seeks by stopping China from
forcibly acquiring American know how. Many economic and
national-security experts back this policy because they see China
as a unique threat to the U.S.
"U.S. officials believe China is engaged in economic warfare
with the aim of displacing the U.S. as the world's pre-eminent
technological and military power," Arthur Kroeber, founding partner
at Gavekal Dragonomics, a China economic research service, told
clients in January. "Hence the response must go far beyond normal
trade tools, and strike directly at China's technological
ambitions."
Peter Navarro, Mr. Trump's adviser on trade and manufacturing
policy, implicitly echoed that in an interview at a Wall Street
Journal conference in June. Every country, including the U.S.,
pursues industrial policy, he said. "But it's important you
distinguish between industrial policies that are predatory,
protectionist and mercantilist and industrial policies which are
within the bounds of acceptable norms."
Mr. Trump entered office convinced that foreigners had robbed
the U.S. of its industrial might, and he would reverse this.
"American cars will travel the roads, American planes will soar in
the skies, and American ships will patrol the seas, American steel
will send new skyscrapers into the clouds," he declared in a
campaign speech in September 2016.
It reflected a political impulse with deep roots. In 1791,
Alexander Hamilton, George Washington's Treasury Secretary, wrote
in his "Report on the Subject of Manufactures" that manufacturers
needed government support to overcome entrepreneurs' risk aversion
and the advantages other countries gave their producers.
Hamilton preferred targeted subsidies over tariffs, which he
thought hurt consumers and sheltered both efficient and inefficient
firms. Congress rejected Hamilton's approach, and the U.S. had high
tariffs -- though the rates often changed -- until the end of World
War II.
Dartmouth College economist and trade historian Douglas Irwin
says tariffs didn't accelerate the development of U.S.
manufacturing because they were designed to meet political rather
than economic priorities. They often ended up helping some
manufacturers (those that competed with imports) at the expense of
others (those that exported).
After the war the U.S. led a world-wide reduction in global
trade barriers via pacts such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, which became the World Trade Organization. Industrial
policy persisted, though, as many countries sought to promote or
prop up national champions by nationalizing or subsidizing them or
bailing them out.
The U.S. has generally resisted such impulses. During the global
financial crisis the administration of Barack Obama did inject
money into big banks and car manufacturers because private capital
had dried up, but exited those positions as quickly as
possible.
Another exception is shipping. In 1920 Congress passed the Jones
Act, which requires goods transported between U.S. ports be carried
on U.S.-built and -operated ships, to ensure a supply of merchant
ships for wartime. A report by the Cato Institute found that the
law has made the industry deeply uncompetitive: American-made
coastal ships and medium-size freighters cost six to eight times as
much as similar foreign-built ships.
The shipping industry has thus declined: The U.S. has only seven
active major shipyards, compared with 60 in Europe, and four sell
exclusively to the defense department, Cato said. High costs have
shifted freight to highway and rail. The average Jones Act-eligible
container ship is eight years older than its foreign counterpart,
it said.
Matthew Paxton, president of the Shipbuilders Council of
America, defends the Jones Act as necessary to protect the domestic
industrial base from subsidized Chinese and Korean shipyards.
Echoing the Jones Act rationale, the Trump administration argues
steel and aluminum are vital to national defense and thus imposed
tariffs of 25% and 10% on them; it is mulling raising tariffs on
imported autos and parts as well .As the tariffs have taken effect,
booth steel and aluminum companies have begun restarting idled
capacity.
But many other industries whose steel inputs have become more
expensive say they may have to raise prices or move production
abroad. A March report by World Trade Partnership, a consulting
firm, concluded the tariffs would boost iron, steel and aluminum
employment by 33,000 but reduce all other manufacturing employment
by slightly more, led by fabricated metals, motor vehicles and
parts, while wiping out an additional 142,000 service-sector jobs.
Nor would they actually help national security: Mr. Trump's defense
secretary, Jim Mattis, wrote that imports don't impair the
acquisition of "steel or aluminum necessary to meet national
defense requirements."
The administration is also weighing citing national security to
force utilities to buy more power from coal-fired or nuclear
generating plants because they store fuel on site, which it claims
makes the grid more reliable.
But nuclear and coal power are declining because natural gas and
renewables are cheaper, cleaner, or both. One consulting firm
estimates the rule could raise customers' costs by up to $12
billion a year without improving grid reliability. A coalition of
businesses warned it would undercut the advantage American
manufacturers have from cheap natural gas and "result in a
substantial loss of U.S. manufacturing capacity and jobs." Nor
would it fundamentally improve the prospects of coal mining or
coal-generated power. "Frankly, if you find an investor who wants
to invest 25 years in coal-fired plants, I would not buy the shares
of that company," Patrick Pouyanné, the chief executive of French
oil company Total SA, told reporters in June.
While governments have a poor record of turning around declining
industries, there is a stronger case for them supporting new
industries, particularly by subsidizing early-stage research when
commercial payoff is most uncertain. This is especially true in
"winner-take-all-or-most" industries in which establishing a
successful technology costs a fortune but adding new customers
costs almost nothing.
In the 1980s Japan seemed to prove that by vaulting to the front
ranks of advanced economies, with the help of technology that
American companies such as International Business Machines Corp.
and Xerox Corp. had been forced to license to Japanese competitors
and a domestic market long sheltered from foreign competition.
Japan's model lost appeal in the 1990s as its economy slumped
and the U.S. companies grabbed the lead in internet, software and
social media. Still, economists became more receptive to industrial
policy and many backed President Obama when he earmarked stimulus
funds and rewrote regulations to favor certain sectors, in
particular renewable energy.
Then China put Japan's playbook into overdrive. It subsidized
key industries, encouraged consolidation to form national champions
and forced multinationals to transfer technology to Chinese
competitors as a condition of selling to China's vast market. That
transfer of technological know-how may have done permanent damage
to the U.S., says Rob Atkinson, president of the Information
Technology and Innovation Foundation, which is supported by major
tech companies.
Tech companies thrive in an ecosystem of specialized suppliers,
customers and workers, and once that ecosystem moves abroad, it may
never return. "If the dollar goes down a lot, we can probably bring
back a boat load of call centers form India. You cannot recreate
semiconductors, biotechnology or aviation the same way," says Mr.
Atkinson.
That hasn't stopped the Trump administration from trying. It
encouraged Taiwan's Foxconn Technology Group to locate a new liquid
crystal display factory in southeastern Wisconsin. The state hopes
it could become the center of a new Silicon Valley. Even with
nearly $4 billion in state and local subsidies and tax breaks,
"it's extremely challenging," says Willy Shih, a manufacturing
expert at Harvard Business School.
He says Foxconn will have to import almost all of its key inputs
except for glass as well as capital equipment and even engineers,
and then ship the finished displays thousands of miles to assembly
plants in Asia.
A spokeswoman for Foxconn said, "Our strategic partners from
Asia and the U.S." will locate their operations to the Wisconsin
campus and "seek to source from companies throughout the
state."
While trying to bring the technology industry back, the
administration is trying to stop even more of it from leaving by
taking a much tougher line on Chinese competition. In March the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a Treasury-led panel
that screens foreign investment for national-security concerns,
blocked then-Singapore-based Broadcom Ltd.'s hostile takeover of
San Diego-based Qualcomm Inc. whose technology is critical to
smartphones and the new 5G wireless communication standard.
In a letter, Treasury cited both traditional national security
concerns, though it wasn't specific about these, and broader
economic worries. It said Broadcom might gut Qualcomm's research
and development to generate a quick payback on the takeover. A
"reduction in Qualcomm's long-term technological competitiveness
and influence in standard setting...would leave an opening for
China to expand its influence on the 5G standard-setting process,"
the letter said. Chinese dominance of 5G "would have substantial
negative security consequences."
Congress is about to rewrite the rules governing CFIUS and
export controls to better enable the U.S. to block foreign
takeovers, minority investments and technology transfers abroad
deemed to endanger the U.S.'s long-term technological leadership.
"The acquisition of a Silicon Valley startup may raise just as
serious concerns from a national security perspective as the
acquisition of a defense or aerospace company, CFIUS's traditional
area of focus," Heath Tarbert, the Treasury official overseeing
CFIUS, told Congress earlier this year. "We must all consider the
cost of doing nothing: the potential loss of America's
technological and military edge."
The administration is also parrying Chinese technological
advance in other areas. In April the Federal Communications
Commission barred smaller rural telecommunications carriers from
using federal subsidies, worth nearly $9 billion a year, to buy
equipment supplied by China's Huawei Technologies Co. and ZTE Corp.
U.S. officials have worried the Chinese government could use the
equipment to spy on Americans. (The companies deny that.)
Meanwhile, U.S. technology companies are getting another weapon
against China: stronger patent rights. In the past, patent owners
were sometimes vulnerable to antitrust complaints from competitors
who claimed the terms of using their technology were so onerous as
to inhibit competition and innovation. Makan Delrahim, head of the
Department of Justice's antitrust division, has signaled that the
bar will now be higher to hold a patent holder liable for antitrust
violations.
This could make U.S. companies less vulnerable to pressure by
foreign trust busters to hand their technology over to local firms.
In 2015 China forced Qualcomm to pay a fine and slash its royalties
to settle antitrust charges. In June a White House report cited
this as proof that China uses antimonopoly law to "extort
concessions" from American firms.
As with its protection of steel and coal, the administration's
protection of American technology companies could impose unintended
harm on the economy. Retaliation by China could rob U.S. companies
of sales and access to China's growing pool of technology talent.
American innovators could be held back if forced to overpay to use
patents.
But mistrust of China is intense enough in both parties that
even legislators long mistrustful of government intervention are
ready to welcome it as a means of holding China back. When ZTE
Corp. was caught contravening an earlier settlement for violating
sanctions on Iran and North Korea, the Trump administration banned
U.S. suppliers from selling it vital components, which could have
put it out of business. At Chinese President Xi Jinping's request,
Mr. Trump reduced the penalty to a fine and change of
management.
Senators from both parties objected and want the penalty
reinstated -- not just to protect national security but to
counteract China's relentless pursuit of dominance of
telecommunications. "In a country full of bad actors when it comes
to hurting American jobs and threatening our national security,
Huawei and ZTE are two of the absolute worst offenders," said
Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer. Added Arkansas Republican
Tom Cotton, "I think the death penalty is the right penalty for
ZTE's behavior."
Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
July 20, 2018 11:50 ET (15:50 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2018 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.