TIDMCDO
RNS Number : 4175S
Carador PLC
18 May 2009
18 May 2009
Carador plc
("Carador" or the "Company")
Interim Management Report
The following interim management statement relates to the period commencing 1
January 2009 to 18 May 2009 and has been prepared solely to provide information
to meet the requirements of the Irish Transparency Regulations.
Investment objective
The Company's investment objective is to produce attractive and stable returns,
with low volatility compared to equity markets, by investing in a diversified
portfolio of senior notes of collateralised debt obligations or "CDOs"
collateralized by senior secured bank loans and equity and mezzanine tranches of
CDOs. CDOs are debt securities backed by a diversified pool of underlying
assets. The CDO uses the cash flows from this portfolio of assets to back the
issuance of multiple classes of rated debt securities which, together with the
Equity Notes, are used to fund the purchase of the underlying assets.
Carador performance summary(1)
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| | 30 April 2009 |31 December 2008 | Change |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| EUR Share Class: | | | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Share price | 0.3000 | 0.4250 | -29.4% |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Net asset value per share | 0.4196 | 0.4919 | -14.7% |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Premium/(discount) | (28.5)% | (13.6)% | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Share total return since | -19.7% | -12.6% | |
| inception(2) | | | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| | 30 April 2009 |31 December 2008 | Change |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| USD Share Class: | | | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Share price | 0.3800 | 0.6000 | -36.7% |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Net asset value per share | 0.5375 | 0.6243 | -13.9% |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Premium/(discount) | (29.3)% | (3.9)% | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
| Share total return since | -34.3% | +0.0% | |
| inception(3) | | | |
+------------------------------+-----------------+------------------+---------------+
The April NAV includes an estimated EUR 1,276,830.62 of net cash flow interest
received in the month (to be allocated between capital and income), which
equates to EUR 0.0090 or USD 0.0119 per Share (4).
The reduction in NAV in the period reflects the updated estimates of cash flows
for the underlying investments which, for certain transactions, have been
reduced to reflect the potential for cash flow diversion due to breaches in the
overcollateralization tests.
The Board declared an interim distribution on 15 January 2009 of EUR0.0015 per
ordinary share in respect of the quarterly period ended 31 December 2008. US
dollar class shareholders received US$0.0019 per share, calculated at the
prevailing exchange rate on 15 January 2008 of EUR1:US$1.3064.
On 15 April 2009, the Board declared an interim distribution of EUR0.0131 per
ordinary share in respect of the quarterly period ended 31 March 2009. US dollar
class shareholders received US$0.0173 per share, calculated at the prevailing
exchange rate on 15 April 2009 of EUR1:US$1.31775.
Investment manager's review
Leveraged Loans
The leveraged loan market has had a very strong performance in the four months
ended 30 April 2009. The CS Leveraged Loan Index generated a 15.75% YTD
return(5) versus -22.93% in 4Q08, outperforming investment grade bonds (Credit
Suisse Liquid US Corporate Index +2.74%), equities (S&P500 -2.49%) and only
marginally underperforming the high yield bond market (CS High Yield Index
+16.48%).
The top performing US leveraged loan industry sectors YTD have been food and
drugs (+30.22%), transportation (+24.72%) and retail (+24.69%). The worst
performing sectors, although still generating positive returns, were chemicals
(+1.50%), manufacturing (+4.63%) and consumer durables (+5.54%) (6).
The performance has been led by the higher quality rating groups with B rated
loans returning +20.31% and BB rated loans returning +17.14%. Returns from
distressed loans (CC, C and default) were negative YTD (-1.82%).
The discount margin for the CS Leveraged Loan Index, assuming a 3-year average
life, tightened from +1842 bps on 31 December 2008 to +1299 bps on 30 April
2009.
The following table summarizes YTD returns for leveraged loans, high yield bonds
and the S&P500 Index(7).
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| | YTD |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| CS Leveraged Loan Index | +15.75% |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| CS Euro Leveraged Loan Index | +9.06% |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| CS Distressed Loan Index | +16.31% |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| CS High Yield Index | +16.48% |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| Credit Suisse LUCI (Liquid US Corporate | +2.74% |
| Index) | |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| S&P 500 | -2.49% |
+------------------------------------------+-----------+
Firmer technical conditions, improved broader markets and better than expected
earning reports from large leveraged issuers have helped support loan prices in
2009. New issues and liquidation activity is a fraction of last year's.
Repayments have also increased to $24.6 billion YTD. This reduction in supply
has taken place as demand has increased, with part of this additional demand
coming from non traditional buyers such as high yield bond and equity funds.
The trailing 12-month institutional leveraged US loan default rate stands at
6.66%(8). Sixty-six companies defaulted in the first four months of 2009(9),
with $39 billion worth of loans outstanding. As a comparison, sixteen companies
defaulted in the last four months of 2008, with $12 billion worth of loans
outstanding. In Europe, we estimate that 23 companies defaulted in 2009 YTD,
versus 10 companies in the last four months of 2008.
Carador's 12 month lagging default rate to 30 April 2009 (latest available
trustee information) was estimated at 4.22%. Since inception, Carador's default
rate has been 4.52% (1.45% annualised).
CLOs
The CLO market has not participated in the loan market rally in 2009. Although
secondary market levels are difficult to source, we estimate that the more
liquid senior part of the capital structure widened by 200-300 bps YTD, to
Libor+700/800 bps. Mezzanine CLO tranches have underperformed. A positive sign,
however, has been the beginning of a differentiating trend between CLOs backed
by stronger portfolios with solid structural features and legal documentation,
and weaker transactions.
The key event in 2009 was the change in the rating methodology for CLOs
announced by S&P and Moody's. Moody's announced early in February that it will
update its assumptions that it uses to rate and monitor CLOs. Specifically,
Moody's updated its default probability assumptions to "reflect the
significantly elevated corporate default rate expectations stemming from the
global recession and tightened credit conditions". Moody's expects that the
revised assumptions will have a significant impact on mezzanine and junior CLO
tranches, resulting in a downgrade of their ratings by three to six notches on
average but that the impact on senior CLO tranches is expected to be small.
CLOs with large buckets for "structured finance" securities, ie, other CLO
tranches, are likely to be affected from a rating and fundamental performance
perspective. The structured finance buckets tend to be concentrated on the lower
rated tranches of other CLOs (BB/BBB) given their spread constraints so
downgrades are likely to bring them down to CCC, increasing their CCC buckets
and bringing them closer to over-collateralization ("OC") test triggers and
potential cash flow diversion. Fundamentally, these investments in other CLO
tranches have the potential to become payment in kind securities, reducing the
cash available for interest payments. In addition, the potential overlap between
the portfolios of the top level CLO and its investments in other CLOs further
increases the risk of cash flow diversions should broadly held loans be
downgraded or default.
Moody's placed 3,600 tranches of USD 100bn notional from 760 deals on review for
possible downgrade. Moody's first stage will be to apply a "parameter" based
approach taking into account the new methodology and assumptions which was
scheduled to be completed before the end of March. The second stage, to be
completed before the end of June, will be more comprehensive and deal specific.
We expect significant downgrades of mezzanine tranches. Senior AAA tranches are
not expected to be affected although specific transactions, with large CCC
concentrations, tight OC tests or large exposure to debt issued by other CLOs
could see downgrades.
Early in March the first results of the changes were released, with the
downgrade of 361 tranches issued by 122 CLOs. Most downgrades (284, 79.11% of
the sample) were downgraded between 4 and 5 notches. 50 tranches (13.93%) were
downgraded 6 notches. 24 tranches (6.69%) tranches were downgraded by 7 notches.
4 of which were originally investment grade. 1 tranche (0.28%) was downgraded 8
notches, from Ba1 to Caa3.
The key changes to S&P rating assumptions included an increase in the 10-year
probability of default for BB and B rated loans, the revision of the recovery
rate in a "AAA" rating stress scenarios for senior secured loans, more stringent
notching of issuer ratings with credits on "creditwatch" negative, and increases
in inter-sector and intra-sector correlation assumptions. S&P has also modified
other aspects of its CDO Evaluator Simulation Model and has included an
"out-the-default-model" test which forces 100% default on the largest industry
sector with no recovery rate requiring that the credit subordination of the AAA
tranche must be greater than the largest industry concentration. This is
expected to particularly affect CLOs backed by Small and Medium Enterprises
(SME) loans which tend to have greater concentration to one industry. S&P stated
that the effect of the change could imply that 75% of "super-senior" AAA could
be downgraded to AA, 72% of AAA to A (and 12% to BBB), and 70% of A rated CLO
notes could be downgraded to BB or below.
The effect in the secondary market of the downgrades is not yet clear since many
investment grade CLO tranches remain rated Baa3 or above. It is unlikely that
holders of junior tranches will become forced sellers as their portfolios are
mainly not rating constrained. For A and AA rated tranches the position is
different as these are mainly held by banks and insurance companies. Downgrades
could lead to an increase in regulatory capital which will be punitive. For
example an eight notch downgrade from single A to single B level (within Moody's
possible scenarios) would force a bank which had adopted Basel II to increase
reserves 25 times from 4% of the notional to 100%. Banks under Basel I would
have to increase capital reserves 12.5 times (10). The real impact of capital
requirements would be felt if super-senior AAA paper were to be downgraded.
Citibank estimates that $300 billion of CLO AAA paper may be held by banks.
Despite these changes, the technical underpining of the CLO market was stronger
in April. Several "Offer Wanted in Competition" ("OWIC") lists were circulated,
a welcomed change from "Bid Wanted in Competition" ("BWIC") liquidation lists we
had grown familiar with in the recent past.
The liquidation of the Whistlejacket SIV was a key event, with investors
purchasing about half of the $5 billion portfolio. The broadly syndicated CLO
component of the liquidation (AAA) reportedly traded in the 70s(11).
As discussed above, the potential selling pressure from banks concerned about
rating downgrades and capital charges has yet to materialize and the market is
gaining comfort about the banks' ability to keep the assets within their balance
sheets.
Another positive factor is the significant discrepancy between the value of the
CLO portfolios and the value of the CLO liabilities generated as a result of the
rally in loan prices. This is particularly relevant for the senior tranches of
CLOs. Using as an example a generic CLO structure, the AAA CLO debt typically
represents 70% of the capital structure, and is backed by loans, which as of 30
April 2009, have an average price of 70.73c(12). If the AAA CLO note is
purchased at a price of 80c, the implied asset coverage would be 1.3x ($70.73c
market value of the loans over $56c market value of the AAA CLO note). The AAA
CLO note is also protected by the fact that the interest due to mezzanine notes
(subordinated to the AAA/AA Notes) can be "paid in kind", redirecting cash flows
to the early amortization of the AAA CLO tranche should certain loan to value
tests be triggered.
Carador overview:
Carador acquired one new investment in the period 1 January 2009 to 30 April
2009. The Company purchased the A2 tranche (AAA rated) of GECLT 06-2, a CLO
backed by a portfolio of senior secured loans serviced by GE Capital Loan
Services. This transaction was purchased at a discount to par and, given its
structure, has started to repay principal in this tranche at par. Since it was
purchased, the tranche's principal factor has decreased from 88.99% to 63.42%,
generating a capital gain for the Company equivalent to the value of the par
less the discounted purchase price.
As at 30 April 2009, 4 investments in the Carador portfolio, representing 3.03%
of NAV had temporarily diverted cash flows to cure OC tests. One investment,
representing 0.00% of NAV had been declared in default.
Portfolio analysis as at 30 April 2009 (13)
By currency:
+--------------+---------------+
| EUR: | 19.1% |
+--------------+---------------+
| USD: | 80.9% |
+--------------+---------------+
| Other: | 0.00% |
+--------------+---------------+
By asset class:
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
| Broadly Syndicated Sub-Investment Grade Secured Loans-Europe | 13.00% |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
| Broadly Syndicated Sub-Investment Grade Secured Loans-US | 52.02% |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
| Middle Markets Secured Loans-US | 3.05% |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
| Other | 0.00% |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
| Cash | 31.93% |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+--------------+
Portfolio holdings
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| | Investment/Manager: | % NAV |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 1 | ACA CLO 2006-2 (Apidos) | 1.02% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 2 | Alpstar I Euro CLO (Alpstar Management) | 0.36% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 3 | CIFC Funding 2006-II (CIFC) | 1.71% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 4 | CS Advisors CLO I (Capital Source) | 0.77% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 5 | Denali Capital CLO VI (DC Funding Partners LLC) | 0.55% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 6 | Duchess VII (Babson Capital) | 0.65% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 7 | Eaton Vance CDO VIII (Eaton Vance) | 0.70% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 8 | Egret Funding CLO I (Egret/SocGen) | 1.44% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 9 | Eurocredit CDO II (ICG) | 0.01% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 10 | Eurocredit VI (ICG) | 0.62% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 11 | Euro-Galaxy CLO (AIG) | 0.73% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 12 | Foxe Basin CLO (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management)(14) | 0.69% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 13 | FM Leveraged Capital Fund II (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 1.26% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 14 | Gale Force 1 CLO (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 0.80% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 15 | Gale Force 2 CLO (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 10.89% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 16 | Gale Force 3 CLO (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 4.07% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 17 | Gale Force 4 CLO (GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 18.70% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 18 | GECLT 2006-2 (GE Capital) | 3.78% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 19 | GLC CLO I (Global Leveraged Capital, LLC) | 0.28% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 20 | Gresham II (Investec) | 0.29% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 21 | Harbourmaster 7 (Harbourmaster) | 0.10% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 22 | Harvest III Euro CLO (Mizuho Leveraged Finance) | 0.77% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 23 | Harvest IV Euro CLO (Mizuho Leveraged Finance) | 0.28% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 24 | Hudson Straits CLO 2004 Ltd. ((GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds | 2.86% |
| | Management) (14) | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 25 | Inwood Park CDO (Blackstone Debt Advisors LP) | 0.61% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 26 | Inwood Park CDO (Blackstone Debt Advisors LP) | 2.04% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 27 | Leopard IV CLO (Prudential M&G) | 0.88% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 28 | Leveraged Finance Europe Capital IV (BNP) | 1.45% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 29 | Mountain View II (Seix Advisors) | 0.39% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 30 | Navigator CDO 2004 (GE Asset Management) | 0.24% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 31 | NYLIM Flatiron CLO 2006-1X (New York Life) | 0.73% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 32 | OWS CLO I (Alcentra) | 0.00% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 33 | Panther CDO III (Prudential M&G) | 1.24% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 34 | Prospect Park CLO (Blackstone Debt Advisors LP) | 1.56% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 35 | RMF Euro CLO III (RMF Investment Management) | 0.96% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 36 | RMF Euro CLO IV (RMF Investment Management) | 1.39% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 37 | Skell 2006-1 X 30/11/2022 (AIB) | 0.91% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 38 | Venture VII (MJX Asset Management) | 1.43% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| 39 | Versailles (BNP) | 0.93% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| | | |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
| | Cash | 31.93% |
+----+------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
Outlook
We continue to explore opportunities to acquire assets particularly AAA rated
CLO notes although we continue to monitor the reaction of current holders to
downgrades based in the changes to the rating methodology of CLOs.
Material events
At the extraordinary general meeting of the Company on 9 March 2009,
shareholders approved the amendment of the Company's investment objective and
investment policy to permit investment in the senior notes of CDOs which are
collaterized by senior secured bank loans.
On 30 April 2009 the Company published the Consolidated Audited Financial
Statements for the period from 1 April 2008 to 31 December 2008.
Other than described above, the Board is not aware of any material events during
the period from 1 January 2009 to the date of publication of this statement
which would have had a material impact on the financial position of the Company.
Investor Enquiries:
Paul Noonan
Northern Trust Investor Services (Ireland) Limited Tel: + 353 1 542 2487
Notes to Editors:
About Carador plc:
Carador is a close-ended limited liability investment company which was
incorporated under the laws of Ireland on 20 February 2006 and is authorised by
the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority. It was the first London Stock
Exchange traded diversified cash flow CDO fund. The Company's investment
objective is to produce attractive and stable returns, with low volatility
compared to equity markets, by investing in a diversified portfolio of senior
notes of collateralised debt obligations or "CDOs" collateralized by senior
secured bank loans and equity and mezzanine tranches of CDOs.
Further information relating to Carador, including monthly factsheets published
since inception, can be found at the Company's website on www.carador.co.uk.
However, due to applicable securities laws and regulations, this information is
only availably to persons resident in certain jurisdictions.
[1] Source: Bloomberg.
[2] Source: Bloomberg TRA function (total share price return analysis).
Inception: 12 April 2006 for EUR class return annualised, 11 December 2008 for $
Class return not annualised. Dividends reinvested at Libor.
[3] Source: Annualised returns. Bloomberg TRA function (total share price return
analysis), dividends reinvested in security
[4] Source: Northern Trust
[5] YTD to 30 April 2009
[6] Source Credit Suisse Leveraged Finance Strategy Update May 2009
[7] The volatility of the indices reflected above and elsewhere in this report
may be materially different from that of the performance of Carador. In
particular, Carador does not have direct exposure to leveraged loans, but rather
its exposure comes through its ownership of CLO securities. In addition, these
indices employ different investment guidelines and criteria than Carador; as a
result, Carador's exposure to leveraged loans may differ significantly from the
securities or other assets that comprise the indices. The performance of these
indices has not been selected to represent an appropriate benchmark to compare
to the performance of Carador, but rather is disclosed to allow for comparison
of the performance of Carador to that of well known, relevant indices. A summary
of the investment guidelines of these indices is available upon request.
[8] Source Credit Suisse Leveraged Finance Strategy Update May 2009
[9] As of 30 April 2009
[10] Source Citibank Global Structured Credit Strategy
[11] Source: IFR
[12] Source Credit Suisse Leveraged Finance Strategy Update May 2009
[13] Source: GSO Capital Partners International LLP
[14] Formerly GSO Debt Funds Management
DISCLAIMER
This document is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an
offer of, or the solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe for, securities of
Carador PLC ("Carador") in the United States or to any person in any other
jurisdiction to whom or in which such offer or solicitation is unlawful. The
distribution of this document in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law
and persons into whose possession this document comes should inform themselves
about, and observe any such restrictions. Further, it does not constitute an
offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any investment in, or to
participate in any trading strategy with GSO Capital Partners International LLP
(the "Manager") or its affiliates, including without limitation, The Blackstone
Group L.P., GSO Capital Partners LP and GSO/Blackstone Debt Funds Management LLC
(collectively, the "Manager's Affiliates") or any investment fund managed or
sponsored by the Manager or the Manager's Affiliates (a "Blackstone Fund").
Carador has not, and will not be, registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended (the "Investment Company Act"). In addition, no offer, issue or
sale of securities of Carador has been, or will be, registered under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities Act") or with any securities
regulatory authority of any State, the United States or other jurisdiction of
the United States. Accordingly, securities of Carador may not be offered, sold,
pledged or otherwise transferred or delivered, directly or indirectly, in or
into the United States, or to or for the account or benefit of any US person
(within the meaning of Regulation S under the Securities Act), except in
transactions that are exempt from registration under the Securities Act and
under circumstances which will not require Carador to register under the
Investment Company Act.
This document is based on information which is otherwise publicly available and,
whilst the Manager uses all reasonable efforts to ensure the information is
accurate and up to date, no representations or warranties are given as to the
reliability, accuracy or completeness of the information. Neither the Manager
nor the Manager's Affiliates accepts any liability for any loss or damage which
may arise directly or indirectly from any use of or reliance on such
information. In particular, you should note that, since many or all of the
Manager investments are unquoted, net asset value figures in relation to Carador
are based wholly or partly on estimates of the values of Carador's investments
provided by the originating banks of those underlying investments or other
market counterparties, which estimates may themselves have been subject to no
verification or auditing process or may relate to a valuation at a date before
the relevant net asset valuation for Carador, or which have otherwise been
estimated by Carador's Investment Advisor.
Information contained herein which relates to the net asset value performance of
Carador may not be indicative of how Carador's investments may perform in the
future. Moreover the values of such investments may fluctuate considerably and
the historic net asset values shown for Carador take no account of the costs or
practical difficulties of realising some or all of such investments. The value
of investments mentioned herein may go down as well as up and investors may not
get back the amount invested. No assurance can be given that the investment
objective will be achieved. Information on past performance, where given, is not
necessarily a guide to future performance. Changes in rates of exchange between
currencies may cause the value of investments to decrease or increase. The
information herein is provided solely for information and does not constitute
investment advice or personal investment recommendations.
The volatility of the indices reflected above and elsewhere in this report may
be materially different from that of the performance of Carador. In particular,
Carador does not have direct exposure to leveraged loans, but rather its
exposure comes through its ownership of CLO securities. In addition, these
indices employ different investment guidelines and criteria than Carador; as a
result, Carador's exposure to leveraged loans may differ significantly from the
securities or other assets that comprise the indices. The performance of these
indices has not been selected to represent an appropriate benchmark to compare
to the performance of Carador, but rather is disclosed to allow for comparison
of the performance of Carador to that of well known, relevant indices. A summary
of the investment guidelines of these indices is available upon request.
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
END
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