BA Boeing Co

By Andy Pasztor and Alison Sider 

Striking internal messages released this week by Boeing Co. have undercut many of the plane maker's defenses of its design and marketing decisions for the beleaguered 737 MAX jet.

Dating back to 2013, the messages offer stark contradictions between internal views about the development of the MAX and the company's public stance. They show Boeing personnel seeking to minimize the amount of training required for MAX pilots, and trying to avoid regulatory scrutiny of the plane's automated flight-control system, a feature that misfired and led to two crashes in less than five months.

In the more than a year since the first fatal crash of the aircraft in Indonesia, Boeing has maintained that its dismissal of extra simulator training for the MAX version of the 737 was based on objective technical and engineering reasons. However, the internal communications suggested that adhering to engineering schedules and cutting operating costs for airlines by avoiding simulator training often trumped safety considerations.

For airlines, putting pilots through simulator sessions is expensive and time-consuming. In its competition with Airbus SE, Boeing made it a selling point of the MAX that it wouldn't require upfront simulator training.

"The language and the sentiments expressed in these communications are totally unacceptable. But they do not mean that Boeing acted inappropriately" in making the case to regulators that simulator training shouldn't be required for the MAX, a Boeing official said Friday. The company didn't sacrifice safety or fundamental airplane design principles to meet that objective, the official said.

Among the numerous email and instant messages were exchanges involving Mark Forkner. As the MAX's chief technical pilot, he aggressively sought to convince some regulators and customers -- even those making a special request -- that extra simulator sessions for the MAX weren't warranted.

With his co-workers, he emphasized the importance of toeing the line for business reasons, saying in one message that he could be blamed for costing the company tens of millions of dollars if he failed to persuade regulators not to require more advanced training.

"I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required," Mr. Forkner wrote in a March 2017 message.

"Boeing will not allow that to happen," he said. "We'll go toe to toe with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement."

In a February 2018 exchange about nagging difficulties with the MAX flight simulator, an unidentified employee had a stunning response: "Our arrogance is our demise."

Mr. Forkner, who is now employed by Southwest Airlines Co., continues to undertake projects at the carrier's headquarters in Dallas, a spokeswoman said Friday. Southwest Chief Executive Gary Kelly has previously commended Mr. Forkner's work at Southwest, while declining comment on his Boeing tenure.

The Southwest spokeswoman said Friday that the internal Boeing messages were disappointing, but that the airline remains confident of ongoing efforts by the aircraft maker and regulators to resolve the MAX issue.

A lawyer for Mr. Forkner didn't respond to requests for comment Friday. His attorney, David Gerger, has previously said that Mr. Forkner was simply blowing off steam in his comments to colleagues and that he believed the MAX was safe.

The 737 MAX has been grounded world-wide since March, following crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that claimed 346 lives and set off one of commercial aviation's biggest crises. Boeing is under investigation by federal prosecutors, securities regulators, aviation authorities and lawmakers. It faces a deluge of lawsuits from the victims' families. It has suspended production of the MAX, a move that is already hurting companies and their employees across the aerospace industry and disrupting travel for passengers.

On Friday, Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc., Boeing's biggest supplier, said it is planning an initial 2,800 layoffs -- the first announced job cuts since the plane's grounding -- and indicated more may come in the future.

The layoffs could make it harder for Boeing to step up MAX production to meet future demand if Spirit has trouble rehiring skilled workers. It could also add to the woes of airlines that have already removed the plane from schedules through June. Flight cancellations and changes have affected thousands of travelers.

Boeing released the internal messages Thursday night, accompanied by an extensive apology, in its effort to signal a more-transparent approach under new management, according to people familiar with Boeing's strategy. Dave Calhoun, who was recently installed as chief executive, starts the job on Monday.

The company also has said it now favors requiring pilots to train in simulators before the MAX returns to service, reversing its long-held position.

Former Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg, who was ousted last month after three decades at the company, will receive $62.2 million in vested incentive awards, stock and retirement benefits. He didn't receive a severance payment but holds stock options received prior to becoming CEO that as of Friday were valued at about $18.5 million.

Mr. Calhoun will receive a base salary of $1.4 million, a $7 million bonus tied to returning the MAX to commercial service and long-term incentives, indicating he plans to remain CEO for an extended time. The planes are expected to return to the air in March or April, but there is no clear deadline and earlier schedules have slipped.

By midday Friday, congressional lawmakers were clamoring for more Boeing documents and aiming their sights on senior executives.

Rep. Peter DeFazio (D., Ore.), chairman of the House Transportation Committee, emphasized that the apparent pressure to save money and make the MAX more marketable to airline customers without upfront simulator training didn't come from individual employees.

"That came from high up in the Boeing corporation," he told reporters, adding that Boeing released the messages following negotiations with lawmakers. He said his staff is expected to meet with Mr. Forkner's lawyer next week to discuss his testifying before the committee, which is investigating the MAX crisis.

In releasing the messages, Boeing said they contained provocative language but said: "We have made significant changes as a company to enhance our safety processes, organization and culture." Without elaborating, the statement indicated employees could be punished as a result of the messages.

After the first crash in late 2018, Boeing officials said the company had opted years earlier against disclosing more to aviators about MCAS, the MAX's powerful new stall-prevention feature, in order to avoid inundating them with information that wasn't useful.

"When Boeing developed its training and materials, it followed a process that was absolutely consistent with introducing previous new airplanes" and new models, a spokesman said late last year.

The company has remained steadfast that it didn't intentionally withhold relevant information, even as pilots have criticized it for not providing details or training on MCAS.

"No one was hiding anything," Mr. Calhoun told CNBC in November, when he was Boeing's board chairman. "It was a set of engineering decisions that ended up being wrong."

Minutes from a 2013 meeting, however, indicate some Boeing executives already were concerned at that early stage that MCAS might trigger additional training requirements if regulators focused on its details. "If we emphasize MCAS is a new function there may be a greater certification and training impact," according to the minutes.

Attendees at the meeting resolved to continue referring to the system as MCAS internally, but to describe it as an addition to an existing system when discussing it with regulators -- apparently to shield it from attention. A Boeing employee designated to act on behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration signed off on that decision, according to the minutes.

The cynical and deceptive tone of some of the messages has shocked many industry veterans. "It's certainly not the Boeing I knew, dealt with and have tremendous respect for," Ray Valeika, former head of engineering and maintenance at Delta Air Lines Inc., said on Friday.

In the wake of the crash in Indonesia, the aviation world started learning about MCAS. Boeing faulted the deceased crew, and in a meeting with American Airlines pilots soon after the accident, Boeing executives expressed confidence that pilots following established procedures could respond safely to the scenario the Lion Air crew had encountered.

During the period when the MAX training requirements were established, however, Boeing employees had dissuaded some airlines from having their pilots receive extra training in simulators before flying the jet, according to some of the internal messages.

One of those pushing for extra training was part of the Lion Air group of airlines, according to a June 2017 exchange between Boeing employees, whose names were redacted.

"I'm trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! Idiots," an unnamed employee wrote.

The next day, Mr. Forkner, identified by title, tried to dissuade an airline from opting for more simulator training in an email, writing to an unnamed official that there was "absolutely no need" for such training...Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a 3 hour simulator session." The airline's name is redacted but one message in the exchange refers to the time in Jakarta, where Lion Air is based, for scheduling a meeting.

The message apparently had an effect. The following day, in an email to a Boeing colleague, Mr. Forkner was jubilant about getting the carrier to change course.

"Looks like my jedi mind trick worked again! These are not the droids you're looking for," he said.

Some employees took swipes at regulators, including one who described a slide show for regulators aimed at demonstrating similarities between the MAX and a previous version of the 737. The employee said: "It was like dogs watching TV."

--Doug Cameron contributed to this article.

Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com and Alison Sider at alison.sider@wsj.com

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

January 11, 2020 09:03 ET (14:03 GMT)

Copyright (c) 2020 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.