By Cezary Podkul and Megumi Fujikawa | Photography by Ben Weller for The Wall Street Journal
Shogo Takemoto's family has tilled the rice fields of eastern
Japan for more than 200 years. They stash their savings in an
agricultural cooperative and borrow from it to help finance the
farm's day-to-day operations.
But with interest rates near zero, the return on the loans is
too little to keep the cooperative going. So it deposits Mr.
Takemoto's savings with Japan's bank for farmers and fishermen,
which sends the money overseas to earn a better yield.
That's how Mr. Takemoto became an indirect investor in car
rental company Hertz Global Holdings Inc. before it declared
bankruptcy in May. Among the owners of Hertz's debt was Norinchukin
Bank, which owned bonds backed by pieces of loans to struggling
companies like Hertz.
Later that month, the bank--founded nearly 100 years ago to
serve the people who feed Japan--disclosed a staggering $3.7
billion unrealized loss on such bonds and said it would pause
further investments.
The loss, which has mostly been recouped as markets rebounded,
was shocking for its size and also because Norinchukin invested
exclusively in triple-A rated bonds, which are supposed to be among
the safest securities anywhere.
The stumble disrupted one of Wall Street's most lucrative trade
routes--a steady flow of capital from yield-starved investors in
Asia who turned to the U.S. to avoid the sting of zero interest
rates at home. In doing so, they channeled their customers' savings
into a boom for loans to some of America's riskiest corporate
borrowers.
"One of the ironies of the global financial system is that a
conservative institution managing the savings of Japanese fishermen
and farmers ends up financing an increase in leverage among risky
U.S. companies," said Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations who tracks global capital flows.
Norinchukin invested in collateralized loan obligations, or
CLOs. These debt funds are meant to give investors access to higher
yields with little additional risk because they buy slices of
hundreds of different corporate loans. Known as leveraged loans,
these corporate loans finance risky borrowers. Because they are
unlikely to all struggle at once, credit-rating firms have labeled
most CLO debt triple-A, putting its risk on par with the U.S.
government.
Norinchukin's CLO holdings, all rated triple-A, account for
about 12% of its overall portfolio, financial filings show. The
bank said that it has been more selective in its CLO investments in
recent months. "Our [CLO] holdings have declined since last year as
we carefully select our investment based on market conditions,"
Norinchukin said in a statement.
Those holdings may no longer be as safe as their triple-A
ratings would indicate. This spring, government-mandated shutdowns
forced businesses of all kinds to suddenly shutter, eroding some of
the benefits of diversification that underpin CLO ratings. One
recent analysis of 95 triple-A rated CLO bonds found that all of
them lost their pristine grades once their rating model was updated
to reflect higher correlations of defaults among businesses.
"A triple-A CLO makes no sense in this market environment," said
Rod Dubitsky, a former Moody's Corp. analyst who conducted the
analysis using Moody's-rated CLOs. An academic study published in
October also concluded CLOs appear riskier than their ratings
suggest.
A Moody's spokesman said its triple-A rated CLOs "continue to
perform well despite the unprecedented economic fallout caused by
the global pandemic."
The market for leveraged loans has doubled since 2008 to about
$1.2 trillion, according to LCD, S&P Global Market
Intelligence's loan research arm. The U.S. market for CLOs grew in
lockstep, reaching nearly $700 billion by March, when the
coronavirus pandemic squeezed deal flow.
Most of that growth came via the Cayman Islands, where zero tax
rates have long attracted money managers seeking a way to give
their clients easy access to U.S. investments without additional
tax burdens beyond their home countries. So many CLOs have been set
up in the Caymans that the offshore financial center has become the
world's biggest foreign lender to U.S. corporations, accounting for
around $6 out of every $10 lent to U.S. businesses from abroad,
according to capital flows data analyzed by The Wall Street
Journal.
Foreign investors helped fuel the growth: They supplied about
20% of the capital behind U.S. CLOs, with Norinchukin alone
accounting for around $4 out every $10 of foreign inflows, the
Journal estimates. Today, the bank holds about $72 billion of CLO
debt, or roughly 10% of the market. About three-fourths of those
holdings were accumulated since December 2015, when the Federal
Reserve began raising rates in the U.S. Shortly after, yields on
Japan's 10-year government bond turned negative for the first time
ever.
The widening gap between interest rates in the U.S. and Japan
left Japanese lenders in a tough spot. They could either invest
locally and earn next to nothing, or go hunting abroad for yield.
Many chose the latter option, but few had a bigger need to do so
than Norinchukin.
The nearly 100 year-old lender was set up to serve Japan's
agricultural, fishing and forestry industries. It does so by
essentially acting as a bankers' bank for a system of cooperatives
set up after World War II to serve each of those industries. Over
the years, they have expanded to operate hospitals, banks and
insurance brokerages even as Japan's agricultural output shrank and
hundreds of thousands of Japanese left farming.
To support that vast infrastructure, Norinchukin collects money
from its member cooperatives, makes investments and pays back
interest to them in the form of so-called incentive payments. The
interest rate, 0.55%, became impossible to earn once Japanese
interest rates fell below zero in 2016, so Norinchukin sought yield
overseas.
"The need to secure sources of incentive payments has always
been the underlying thinking" of Norinchukin's investments, said
Aki Aneha, a Komazawa University economics professor who has
studied Japan's agricultural history.
In 2018, as the gap between key U.S. and Japanese interest-rate
benchmarks widened to nearly three percentage points, Norinchukin
vastly expanded its CLO investments. The bank added a net $27
billion to its holdings, financial filings show. It also increased
the number of CLO managers that it works with, industry sources
say.
Norinchukin's heft made it a coveted investor in the CLO
industry. The bank frequently bought entire triple-A pieces of CLO
deals, according to people in the industry familiar with its
operations. That gave Norinchukin the ability to insist on its own
deal terms, known in the industry as Nochu stipulations.
Today Norinchukin works with a who's who of the CLO industry.
Its stable of CLO managers includes such firms as Apollo Global
Management, Ares Management Corp., Neuberger Berman Group, Eaton
Vance Corp., Blackstone Group's GSO credit investment arm and First
Eagle Alternative Credit, among more than a dozen others.
Michael Herzig, head of business development for New York-based
First Eagle, says it's not easy landing a spot on Norinchukin's
list of approved managers. The bank monitors managers' performance
and handpicks whom it wants to invest with. "It's like getting an
offer from Goldman Sachs. The more you ask, the less likely you are
to get it," Mr. Herzig said.
The coronavirus pandemic hit the CLO market quickly. In a matter
of days in March, prices of hundreds of loans owned by CLOs
plummeted as business closures took a toll on the economy.
Some CLOs went shopping for bargains. First Eagle, which runs a
suite of CLOs known as Wind River, scooped up about $10 million
worth of a loan issued by Hertz just days before the car rental
company filed for bankruptcy in May, trading disclosures show. The
Wind River funds paid around 66 cents on the dollar for the
investment.
Five months later, Hertz has obtained financing to carry itself
through bankruptcy and its once-discounted loan is trading nearly
at full face value, benefiting end-investors like Norinchukin,
which owns pieces of the Hertz loan via several of First Eagle's
CLOs.
Such buying-and-selling of loans--and the Federal Reserve's
unprecedented support for corporate credit markets--made it easier
for CLOs to weather the fallout created by the pandemic. Although
thousands of businesses have filed for bankruptcy this year and
vast swaths of loans have been downgraded, prices for
investment-grade CLO bonds have mostly recovered, pricing data from
Solve Advisors shows. Some asset managers have even launched
exchange-traded funds that buy CLOs, with one claiming the ticker
"AAA."
A Norinchukin spokesman said the bank held a Yen130 billion
($1.24 billion) unrealized loss on its CLO portfolio at the end of
June, down from the $3.7 billion March-end figure it disclosed in
May. At the time Norinchukin said it would pause making new
investments as it re-evaluated its holdings. But it remains
committed to staying in the market.
"There is no change in our view that we will continue to invest
in CLOs as part of our credit assets," the bank said.
Mr. Takemoto, whose 50-hectare rice farm is in Japan's Ishikawa
prefecture, said he didn't realize that his money traveled to
Tokyo, the Cayman Islands, New York and on to Hertz. But he doesn't
blame Norinchukin for sending his savings overseas.
"I think it is OK to make aggressive investments as part of a
large portfolio," he said.
Write to Cezary Podkul at cezary.podkul@wsj.com and Megumi
Fujikawa at megumi.fujikawa@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
November 05, 2020 05:44 ET (10:44 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2020 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.